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Introduction
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the fifteen union republics of the
former superpower separated into newly independent sovereign states. The largest of these,
the Russian Federation, has since emerged as the most capable and politically assertive and
has inherited the majority of its predecessor’s geopolitical and strategic interests. Though
Moscow’s interests in its “near-abroad”1 reflect the implications of its longstanding imperial
legacy in the region, Russia entered the post-Soviet period pursuing a confused strategy of
disengagement with regards to the new and unstable countries of the Former Soviet Union
(FSU). Beginning in mid-1992 and continuing into late-1994, however, Russia began
implementing a more assertive and interventionist response strategy to address the region’s
growing instability. Though these actions were categorized by so-called liberal
internationalists in the Russian government as “peacekeeping” operations, they in practice
served largely to forward the national interests of the Russian Federation, namely the
enforcement of target state membership in the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), the
prevention of external interference, and the perpetuation of Russian military presence in the
key geopolitical choke points of the former Soviet Union.
My research draws from a combination of constructivism and historical institutionalist
theory to demonstrate how, despite the Russian government’s early commitment to
internationalist norms, fluid institutional preconditions allowed for a series of key structural
shifts in the early post-Soviet period to drive administrative inertia away from the weakly
institutionalized liberal-pacifist ideals of the Gorbachev era and towards a more muscular,
nationalist, and zero-sum foreign policy strategy. In this context, the period from mid-1992

1

Drawn from the Russian blizhneye zarubezhye,the term arose in popularity within Russia following the
collapse of the USSR as a common reference to the territories currently comprising the fourteen other former
Soviet territories. Though it remains in partial use today, the term developed somewhat of a negative
connotation towards the late 1990’s as a term borne primarily of Russian imperialism.
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through late-1994 saw a rise in Russian intervention in the near abroad as intervening events
challenged the orthodoxy of the isolationists in power and legitimized the efforts of
revanchist policy entrepreneurs framing the use of force as a justifiable and necessary foreign
policy strategy.
To effectively demonstrate this shift, I will be reviewing and assessing the nature of
Russia’s involvement in the secessionist wars in Moldova and Georgia as case studies for
assessing the development of Russian foreign policy making in the near abroad. Drawing
from sources pertaining to these conflicts I will then present a set of narratives detailing the
sources of these conflicts as well as the development of Russia’s interventionist strategy as
they pertain to this observed shift in the foreign policy calculation of the Russian Federation.
Ultimately, this project will contribute to the debate within international relations over the
specific mechanisms that shape actor preferences and lead states to pursue foreign
intervention.
I have limited my set of cases to a small handful of ethnic conflicts in the near abroad
in order to focus specifically on the coercive strategy Russian policymakers develop in the
context of conflict resolution in the near abroad. I have therefore excluded discussion of
Russia’s peacekeeping intervention in Tajikistan as it is both geographically removed from
my focus area of the greater Black Sea and lacks the same coercive elements present in other
instances of intervention. I also eschew focus on the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh given that the proposed Russian peacekeeping mission
was never deployed and that evidence for Russia’s indirect interference is comparatively less
abundant. I have also excluded coverage of Russia’s intervention into Chechnya given that it
occurs beyond the chronological scope of my project and also technically qualifies as a
domestic conflict. Lastly, I have chosen not to include discussion of Crimea and the war in
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Eastern Ukraine given similar time frame issues, alongside the fact that their ongoing status
limits access to reliable information regarding the conflict and its combatants. Furthermore, a
comparison of cases, as opposed to a singular case study, will aid in demonstrating the
gradual evolution of consensus in regarding policy towards the near abroad.
At this point it is necessary to effectively operationalize my use of the term
“intervention” within the context of my argument. To do so, I rely on James Rosenau’s
definition of the term as “any action whereby one state has an impact upon the affairs of
another,” qualified as such through its convention-breaking behavior - the degree to which an
intervention breaks from formerly established behavior - and its authority-orientatednature whether intervention is aimed at maintaining or altering the authority structure of the target
nation.2 Although the degree to which Russian interventionist actions constitute
convention-breaking behavior is tempered by Moscow’s history of frequent and direct
intervention in these republics during the Soviet period, this project aims to understand the
behavior of the Russian Federation and thus recognizes the breakup of the USSR as
constituting a sufficient break from former practices. Accepting this potential caveat, the
scope of convention-breaking and authority-breaking behavior Russia employs in these
conflicts is broad, ranging from but not limited to: the provision of financial assistance,
military equipment, logistics training and/or direct military aid to a target faction; the
deployment of purportedly neutral peacekeeping forces; the weaponization of conflict
resolution as a tool of coercive diplomacy.
The structure of this project will proceed as follows. Chapter One will contain a
contextual engagement and assessment of the alternative explanations for Russia’s behavior
in the near abroad offered by competing schools in international relations followed by a more

2

James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Journal of Conflict Resolution 13(June 1969): 153.
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in depth summation of my argument and the historical factors supporting it. In Chapter Two I
will provide a short section on foreign policy debate in the early Russian Federation
alongside an overview of the country’s institutional structure as well as the key actors and
organizations that initially helped shape Russia’s foreign policy decision making. Chapter
Three will include a brief but critical overview of Soviet Nationalities policy as it pertains to
the conflict spirals that developed. Chapters Four and Five will detail my two separate case
studies, Moldova and Georgia, respectively, with emphasis on the development,
implementation, and implications of Russia’s intervention strategy. The final section will be a
conclusion in which I reassert and defend my argument that a constructivist understanding of
the structural, institutional, and domestic shifts that influenced Russian policy best explains
the incidence and nature of early Russian intervention in the near abroad.
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Chapter One - Alternative Explanations & Argument Summary
Structural Theories
In order to assess the development of Russia’s interventionist strategy from the
perspective of international relations theory, it is first crucial to review and assess the
competing explanations for state behavior posed by other theories and paradigms. The
mainstream structural theories that traditionally prevail in international relations discourse,
neo-realism and liberal institutionalism, present differing, though fundamentally similar
frameworks for understanding the behavior of states. Both rely on assumptions regarding the
implications of international anarchy and the relative preference stability of individual level
agents that such structural forces induce.
Neo-realists, also known as structural realists, generally hold that the the lack of an
international arbiter with a global monopoly on the use of force breeds anarchy, forcing states
to compete for power with one another on a zero-sum basis.3 They also assert broadly that
states constitute the primary actor in international affairs and are generally assumed to be
rational actors committed to their continued security as ensured by “self-help” strategies,
namely the maintenance and projection of political, economic, and military power.4 The
argument thus follows that states pursue intervention to either expand their influence or to
respond to threats from potential rivals. Under these circumstances, neorealist theories would
assert that Russia’s interests and behavior are determined by its geography and position in the
international system and that such interests are fundamentally inescapable.

3

Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military
Interventionism, 1973-1996, MIT Press, BCSIA Studies in International Security, Cambridge, 1999, 6.
4
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118. Waltz, however, has emphasized that, while states are
of course not unitary actors, the unitary state assumption can remain implicit in his argument since the pressures
and conditions of the international system are still the primary forces that shape elites’ behavior and preferences
once they hold positions of power. For more see: Kenneth N. Waltz, "Response to My Critics," in Keohane,
Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 338-39.
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As many have noted, however, this pessimistic understanding of statecraft is belied by
the considerable degree of international cooperation characteristic of the post-WWII era. This
position is championed by liberal institutionalists, who highlight the ways in which
international institutions can mitigate the negative implications of anarchy by helping to
enforce inter-state commitments, lowering transaction costs, and providing incentive
structures for states to encourage cooperation and discourage delinquency.5 Therefore liberal
institutionalists largely frame intervention as a tool for the stabilization of the international
system to the degree that they can strengthen these economic, institutional, and normative ties
between states.6 While this situation remains more or less consistent amongst the world’s
industrialized democracies, some liberal theorists recognize that such cooperation is hindered
where countries lack common values and norms, strong interweaving economic linkages, and
a history of mutual engagement through international organizations.7
The latter circumstance aptly describes the initial state of affairs in Russia and the
states of the former Soviet Union, in the process highlighting the marginal usefulness of
structural logic towards understanding Russia’s foreign policy in the region. Liberal Russian
policy makers might hope to portray the CIS as an effective international institution with a
strong bureaucratic infrastructure designed to preserve stability and help its members
integrate economically with the West on the basis of their common commitment to market
economies and pluralist democracy. In reality most observers note that, while ostensibly
useful as a means of coordinating policy between its members, the CIS grew to function as an

5

Bennett, 
Condemned to Repetition, 6.
See John G. Ikenberry, "Why Export Democracy?: The 'Hidden Grand Strategy' of American Foreign Policy'"
The Wilson Quarterly (Vol. 23, no.2 (Spring 1999) 2; Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil
Conflict
. Cambridge, U.K.: (Cambridge UP, 2004).
7
See James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-cold
War Era." 
International Organization46, no. 2 (1992): 467-91.
6
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instrument for exerting Russian hegemony in the states of the former Soviet Union.8
Moreover, the overwhelming evidence available suggests that, while there is a certain degree
of truth to the liberal argument that Russian “peacekeeping” interventions in the near abroad
were designed to stabilize Russia’s turbulent periphery, the Russian government’s later
insistence on maintaining Russian dominated missions that excluded potentially more capable
actors, such as the United Nations (UN) and Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) as well as Romania and Ukraine, suggests a more sober and strategic line of decision
making focused on the balance of power in these geopolitically significant regions.
The strategic goals that underlie Russia’s interventions in the near abroad appear to
fulfill structural realist expectations regarding the incentives that anarchy creates for Moscow
to act forcefully and decisively to retain or restore hegemony in areas of its former
preeminence. The language of nominally liberal Russian politicians also appears to support
this position, as President Boris Yeltsin has frequently emphasized that “geopolitics” force
Russia to preserve a powerful presence in Eurasia.9 Even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev,
the quintessential voice of liberal internationalism within the Russian government, noted by
late 1993 that Russia’s refusal to intervene in conflicts in the near abroad would allow its
“neighbors in Asia” to fill the vacuum and thus “force Russia out of the region and restrict its
influence.”10 This perspective aptly characterizes the rationale Russia ultimately championed
as it pursued various “peacekeeping” interventions in Moldova and Georgia, states which

8

Robert H. Donaldson, and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia : Changing Systems, Enduring

Interests / Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee.2nd ed. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. 178.
9
Jeffrey Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy,”in Adeed Dawisha &
Karen Dawisha (eds), The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia(Armonk, NY,
M.E. Sharpe, 1995) 48.
10
Quotations drawn from Kozyrev’s interview in Izvestiya, 8October 1993. cited in: Fiona Hill and Pamela
Jewett, 
"Back in the USSR": Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the
Implications United States Policy Toward Russia,Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions
Project,John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994, 9.
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initially declined membership in the CIS, thus threatening to escape Moscow’s direct sphere
of influence.
Though convincing, the neorealist analysis has difficulty answering one key question:
what, then, explains the lack of interventionist appetite in the period directly preceding and
following the fall of the Soviet Union? For example, Kozyrev’s rhetoric in early 1992
rejecting the use of force in the near abroad paints a far different picture than beliefs he
expressed even just a year later. Most realist theories admit that state (and by association,
elite) interests can change in response to the changing structure of the international system
though they underscore the fact that long-term elite preferences are stable, rational, and
generally unaffected by sub-state factors such as domestic or bureaucratic constraints.11
For example, realists such as Allen Lynch point to crucial structural turning points
such as the muted Western response to Russian intervention in Moldova (covered in more
detail in Section three) as demonstrating to Russian moderates that the unsanctioned use of
force to reign in the near abroad might not compromise the primary objective for liberals at
this time: the accession of Western financial aid.12 In reality this is merely an isolated, though
important, part of the greater picture. While this certainly was a crucial moment in the course
of events that followed, it is not necessarily as transformative as Lynch asserts. As will be
explored later, Yeltsin and Kozyrev both expressed lasting commitment to the liberal norms
of non interference for months after events in Moldova transpired. It was only after
significant domestic pressure from the anti-liberal nationalist political opposition and a series
of independent actions taken by the military that by early 1993, Yeltsin began to express

11

See Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics
; David Lake, Power, Protection and Free Trade: International
Sources of US Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Christopher
Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17(Spring 1993).
12
Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 1 (2001): 14.
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more unilateralist views and Russian policy began moving in a pragmatic, traditional
“geopolitics” oriented direction.
The Comparative Benefit of an Ideas-Based Approach
There is thus a great deal of precision and specificity lost with the deterministic
assumptions of rational and unitary state actors that realism demands. How then can this
transition be better explained? To answer this question more substantively, it is necessary to
turn to the domestic political, institutional, and ideational factors shaping policy in the early
Russian Federation. This emphasis on sub-state level factors, however, should not impinge
upon the consideration of forces at the international level as they very often directly serve to
shape the incentives and opportunities of domestic actors involved in policy making.13 To this
end, my work relies heavily on the historical institutionalist approach of Jeffrey Checkel,
with particular emphasis on how these external stimuli provide institutional actors
opportunities to press the boundaries of foreign policy choice.
At this point it is necessary to specify what is meant by an “institution” in this
context. Institutions, broadly defined, constitute both formal organizations as well as informal
sets of norms and rules that are both historically and cognitively constructed and set the
parameters for collective action.14 In the context of political decision making, these “coercive
social facts” serve to constrain the activity, regularize the behavior, and shape the preferences
of agents, given, or perhaps in spite of the fact that they exist and operate as a product of the
normative understandings and ideas held by their constituent parts: in this case, the agents
themselves.15

13

Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy', 48.
Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change : Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the
Cold War, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, 6. See also, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 399.
15
Ibid., 399.
14
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To mitigate the chaos that multiple competing normative understandings of ideal
conduct might have on the smooth institutional operations of, for example, a state, most
organizations formulate broad “operational philosophies” that help to orient their behavior.16
Applied to foreign policy, these operational philosophies are often expressed as national ideas
- the broad concepts and beliefs held by foreign policy elites regarding ideal policy
prescriptions. National ideas offer agents specific frameworks through which to define state
interests, frame threats, and proscribe ideal policy solutions.17 They also provide a benchmark
against which policy success is assessed and can prevent or propel the implementation of
alternative strategies that stand to reshape the prevailing status quo assumptions.18 In this
sense, ideational commitments can prove incredibly influential on political outcomes.
As Checkel notes, within centralized states, potential carriers of new ideas such as
individual “policy entrepreneurs,”19 NGO’s or other transnational interest coalitions often
have limited access to top decision makers, allowing the “organizational ideologies” of the
center to remain relatively insulated from unwanted ideational static.20 The foreign policy
making apparatus of the former USSR, for example, was dominated by the operational
philosophies of the Communist Party which included, namely, a class based understanding of
the international system and a zero-sum approach to international politics.21 The highly
centralized nature of this infrastructure allowed for these national ideas to dominate Soviet

16

Jeff Legro, “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power,” Perspectives on Politics Vol.
5, No. 3, September 2007, 522.
17
Andrew Flibbert, “The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War,” Security
Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, 2006, 310.
18
Legro, “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power,” 516.
19
As Checkel defines them, policy entrepreneurs are “purveyors of new concepts and ideologies” seeking to
influence policy outcomes in order to maximize their individual and group interests; Checkel, “Ideas,
Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” World Politics, Vol.45 (2), 273
20
Checkel, 

Ideas and International Political Change, 9.
21
Although Stalin’s death and Kruschev’s “thaw” certainly signalled a reorientation of the CPSU’s operational
philosophies, the party retained in large part their emphasis on class conflict and zero-sum interactions as the
forces which structure the workings of the international system.
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foreign policy making until their increasingly evident failure to achieve desired outcomes
compelled the country’s political leadership to seek new ideas and expertise in the
mid-1980’s.22 Taking the form of Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” these new national ideas
remained en vogue among the Soviet political elite into the early 1990’s even as centrifugal
forces of anti-center irredentism and ethnic conflict, themselves a partially product of new
thinking, conspired to destabilize and ultimately dissolve the union.
While these forces bred a degree of conservative backlash within the Soviet Union,
the state’s centralized structure allowed for the Gorbachevian buzzwords of
“interdependence” and “mutual security” to persist into the early post fall period.23 By
contrast, structurally decentralized states, such as Russia post-collapse, are much more
susceptible to the ideational uncertainty brought on by rapid structural changes or schemata
altering political shocks, such as the sudden collapse of a multi-continental empire.
Decentralized states are also subject to greater competition between domestic and
bureaucratic interest groups vying for ideational influence over the policy making process.
The seemingly disorganized and often contradictory foreign policy of the early Russian
Federation reflects this sort of ideationally driven bureaucratic competition. Particularly from
early-1992 to mid-1993, individual heads of certain influential power ministries (mainly the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence) possessed considerable freedom to
declare and pursue their opposing agendas with limited executive oversight. As the literature
on the so-called “first image”24 would suggest, the weakness and disorganization of Russia’s
early institutions and the fluid circumstances following the breakup of the USSR atop

22

Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy,” 44.
Ibid., 43.
24
The three “images” of international relations refer to the three traditional levels of analysis, the individual, the
state, and the international system, respectively. For full discussion of the three “images,” see Kenneth N. Waltz,
Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis, Topical Studies in International Relations, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959.
23
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Yeltsin’s general tendency towards poor leadership and indecision meant that circumstances
were ripe for lower level individuals to play a leading role in influencing policy outcomes.25
Such situations appear well suited for Graham Allison’s bureaucratic politics model, a
prominent organizational framework that links individuals’ interests to the organizational
positions they hold, often encapsulated by the phrase “where you stand depends on where
you sit.”26 Put simply, bureaucrats will often prefer policies that materially benefit themselves
or their organization, meaning a defense minister will likely advocate for an arms buildup as
a means to increase his state’s defence budget. While helpful for understanding the political
implications of bureaucratic infighting, the model often overestimates the degree to which
bureaucrats’ interests actually reflect their positions. Foreign Minister Kozyrev, for example,
even after the unseating of key nationalist policy adversaries after Yeltsin disbanded the
parliament in fall 1993, later began espousing decidedly nationalist policy positions,
suggesting a change in thinking divorced from bureaucratic interest.27
In this sense, the approach I adopt here bears a great deal in common with learning
theory, a model drawn from social psychology which examines how actors modify their
preferences as they acquire more knowledge.28 Learning theory also emphasizes actors’
cognitive 
perceptionsof material power and the translation of these perceptions into
outcomes as well as how outside events generate perceptions of failure or success that can
influence the legitimacy of political coalitions and the power of those perceived responsible
for policy outcomes.29 As Andrew Bennett asserts in his exhaustive application of learning

25

Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men," International Security25, no. 4 (2001):
140-143.
26
Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971),
176.
27
Bennett, 
Condemned to Repetition, 65.
28
Ibid.,
81.
29
Bennett, 
Condemned to Repetition, 71. For similar application of the learning-coalitional model, see alsoJack
L. Snyder, 
Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and International Ambition / Jack Snyder,Cornell Studies in
Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991.
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theory to Russo-Soviet interventionism, ruling coalitions often lose legitimacy and can be
removed from power when their ideas become associated with failed policy outcomes.30 This
highlights the fact that while material resources can and often do determine the relative
strength and influence of constituent bureaucracies, lessons learned by perceived failures and
successes are in some cases even more crucial towards maintaining policy legitimacy.
Checkel furthers this claim, arguing that even if policy crisis does not cause
coalitional change to occur immediately, such situations nonetheless serve to benefit select
ideational camps by creating “policy windows” through which aspiring policy entrepreneurs
forwarding a set of replacement ideas might jump.31 These windows often occur during
periods of flux that allow ideas to play key role in determining the relative influence of
domestic interest groups competing for policy leverage. As Jeff Legro argues, the opening of
a policy window following the “delegitimation” of previously dominant ideas might not
always lead to immediate policy change, as there must be sufficient consensus surrounding a
potential replacement.32 In fact, if there exists a multitude of replacement ideas poised to
unseat the status quo, continuity should prove more likely than change. If, however, there
exists a singular set of replacement ideas and those ideas generate perceivably desirable
results, then long term change becomes likely.33
In the context of the late Soviet and Early Russian period, this process of policy crisis,
delegitimation, policy window opening, and idea reconsideration occurred in three major
stages: the first was Gorbachev’s pursuit of “new thinking” following the policy window
opened by the evident failures of a zero-sum foreign policy in Afghanistan and the stagnation

30

Bennett, 
Condemned to Repetition,79.
Jeffery T. Checkel,“Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution.” World Politics, vol.
45, no. 02, 1993, 273; cited in: Cashman, Greg, and Leonard C Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War:
Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007, 356.
32
Legro, “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power,” 524.
33
Ibid., 523-524.
31
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of the autarkic Soviet planned economy in the mid-1980’s. In this case, the traditionalist ideas
of the CPSU, delegitimated by the crises they caused, were traded in exchange for more
liberal internationalist orientations towards foreign and economic policy. The second stage
was the initial preservation of these liberal internationalist ideas following the collapse of the
USSR and attempts by bureaucratic actors to demonstrate the value of these integrationist
ideas by implementing them to achieve desirable results. The third stage was the eventual
delegitimation of these liberal ideas by intervening structural, domestic, and institutional
factors and events that signalled a collapse of the liberal platform, opening a policy window
for revanchist policy entrepreneurs seeking a partial return to the zero-sum policy of the Cold
War era. It is to this third stage of developments that the thrust of my argument and scope of
this project is devoted. The following section will involve a closer examination of the third
stage as well as the aforementioned factors and events involved in shaping the development
of Russian foreign policy.
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Chapter Two - The Foreign Policy Debate in the Early Russian Federation
In the early post-Soviet period, the struggle between Russian foreign policy elites to
formulate a unitary approach to peacekeeping and intervention in the near abroad can be
viewed in the context of their broader search for a reliable and comprehensive foreign policy
strategy. Factors that affect and influence this debate largely concern the defense of Russia’s
so-called national interests which, though varied and circumstantial, traditionally include
ensuring domestic stability and territorial integrity, retaining the largely inherited geopolitical
position of the Soviet Union, and preventing the emergence of expansionist regional
hegemons in Europe, South Asia, and the Far East that might encroach upon regions of
traditional Russian influence.34 In this context, the emergent ethnic conflicts throughout
Russia’s near abroad become the litmus test for Russia’s ability to actively defend these
interests in the face of perceived anti-Russian adversity.
Russia’s responses to these interests are, however, by no means universal or
prescribed. Particularly in the years 1992-1994, domestic resolve on questions of national
security and, more specifically, policy towards the “near abroad,” was determined at least
partially by the orientation of the ruling coalition that became dominant within the country’s
political elite hierarchy. During this period of time, three main groups are seen as vying for
power within the Russian Federation’s political field: liberal internationalists (isolationists),
centrist nationalists (pragmatists), and radical nationalists (neo-imperialists).35 Though these
34

Bruce Parrott, State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia / Editor, Bruce
Parrott, The International Politics of Eurasia; v. 5. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 84.
35
These classifications and their parenthetical counterparts represent a conglomeration of a handful of different
authors’ typologies for distinguishing between factions and coalitions within the Russian parliament and foreign
policy making apparatus. They are consolidated and slightly modified here for the sake of clarity. For alternative
frameworks for examining these schools of thought, see: Malcom et. al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign
Policy
, Oxford, England ; New York: Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford
University Press, 1996;Parrott, State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia,
84-85; Bennett, Condemned to Repetition,305-309; Dov Lynch, R
 ussian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS:
the Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan, St. Martin's Press in Association with the Royal Institute of
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groups lack definite homogeneity and contain members who proved prone to abrupt or
unexpected reversals of position, this framework provides a useful benchmark for classifying
the schools of thought characterizing the foreign policy debate in the early years of the
Russian Federation. The individual prescriptions of each major grouping are compiled below.
Liberal Internationalists
Commonly classified as “liberal isolationists” or “liberal confederationists,” members
of this group often viewed the weakness of Russia and the other post-Soviet states as a result
of incompletely implemented democratic and free market reforms.36 They thus prioritized
further integration with the West by demonstrating a shared regard for international law,
democratic norms, and neoliberal economic institutions based on both pragmatic aims to
secure western financial aid and new normative understandings of international relations
following the conclusion of the Cold War.37 Likewise, members of this group saw Russia’s
continued provision of centralized subsidies to the constellation of economically weak and
increasingly conflict stricken states in the “near abroad” as not only an obstacle to this
objective, but a tremendous economic burden that Russia could not afford to maintain.38
Nevertheless, they more or less assumed that the countries of the near abroad would
remain close to Russia and offered little by way of a security strategy in the region beyond
insisting that the international community recognize Russia’s “special interests” in these
areas.39Absent this recognition, the liberal internationalists still rejected outright the use of
International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme, 2000, 42-45; Alexander Pikayev, Peacekeeping and the
Role of Russia in Eurasia,Edited by Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, Westview Press, 1996. 51-66.
36
Bennett, 
Condemned to Repetition, 306-307.
37
Lynch, 
Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, 43.
38
Pikayev, 
Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia,51; Estimations of subsidies paid to CIS member
states in 1991 amounted to nearly $17 billion. Accounting for purchasing power parity given the weakness of
the ruble in comparison to the dollar at the time, these transfers comprised approximately 10 percent of Russia’s
gross domestic product (GDP).
39
Donaldson and Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia, 190. This assertion was not made by Kozyrev but rather

by his first deputy foreign minister, Fedor Shelov-Kovediaev in a report entitled “Strategy and Tactics of
Russian Foreign Policy in the New Abroad.” In the early days of 1992, Shelov-Kovediaev was the individual to
whom chief responsibility for contact with the near abroad within the Foreign Ministry was initially entrusted.
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force as a viable instrument of policy in the near abroad on the grounds that it would
compromise Russia’s integration into the club of G-7 powers, on which Russia remained
deeply dependent financially well into the late 1990’s.40 The liberal internationalist view was
thus that diplomatic conflict resolution could constitute a positive-sum interaction wherein
cooperation with international institutions might generate outcomes that could prove mutually
beneficial to both Russia and the West.41 Prominent liberal internationalists included Deputy
Prime Minister Yeigor Gaidar, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and President Boris
Yeltsin, the latter two of whom shifted steadily to more centrist nationalist views by 1994.
Centrist Nationalists
The centrist nationalists - or “pragmatists,” as they are sometimes called - subscribed
to views on Russian Foreign policy broadly compatible with Western notions of “defensive
realism,” viewing stability in the “near abroad” as crucial to Russia’s internal security and
revitalization.42 Rejecting the overly optimistic views of the liberal internationalists as
“romantic wishful thinking,” the pragmatists argued that excessive focus on normative goals
over national interests would risk sacrificing the latter to potentially disastrous effect.43 They
therefore proposed a strategy of limited engagement in the near abroad, concerned for both
the defence of Russians and Russian speakers as a practical matter of limiting migration from
the FSU and for maintaining Russia’s key economic and security interests there.44 To this
end, they sought limited yet pragmatic cooperation with Western powers and institutions in
order to gain international recognition as a “peacekeeper” in the near abroad and also limit
blowback from the West and potential anti-Russian balancing in the near abroad. They
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ultimately believed, that Russia’s retention of Great Power status relied on its ability to
preserve uncontested preeminence in the former Soviet space and thus were hesitant to allow
international institutions a broad mandate to determine the terms of conflict resolution at the
expense of Russian geostrategic interests.45 Key members included State Counsellor Sergei
Stankevich, Presidential Council member Andranik Migranyan, as well as various members
of the Supreme Soviet.
Radical Nationalists
Members of this diverse group of communists and hardline neo-imperialists widely
lamented the Soviet collapse and were openly skeptical of, if not hostile towards, Western aid
programs, which they viewed as a conspiracy aimed at weakening the Russian economy.46
They urged the defence of ethnic Russians and wished to aggressively assert Russia’s
preeminence in the FSU, demonstrating a ready willingness to use force to prevent a domino
effect of anti-Russian regimes spreading throughout the near abroad.47 They in turn strongly
opposed joint peacekeeping operations with non-CIS powers or international organizations,
fueled by concerns that Western powers might use their considerable influence within these
organizations to secure their victory in the Cold War by establishing a Western sphere of
influence in the FSU that would pose a direct threat to Russian security interests.48 Notable
members included Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, as
well as the coalition between communists and extreme nationalists in parliament, often
referred to as the Red-Brown coalition, which dominated the opposition against Yeltsin
throughout much of 1992 and 1993.
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Domestic and Institutional Sources of Russian Foreign Policy Making
Though varied, the primary sources of foreign policy making during these years
remained largely contingent on the actions of an array of decentralized and competing
ministries with limited horizontal coordination. As such, the President retained, for the most
part, a large deal of central authority, much of which was bolstered in the realm of foreign
policy making through Yeltsin’s creation of the Security Council and dismemberment of the
Supreme Soviet in the spring and fall of 1993. Nevertheless, the official position of the
Kremlin during this period is often difficult to ascertain if not downright contradictory.
President Yeltsin exhibited varying adherence to each of the various schools of thought, a
circumstance owing at least partially to aspects of his personality. Often relying on
contradictory information from competing sources, Yeltsin often gathered information in a
characteristically informal fashion and displayed a strong propensity for emotionally charged
and impulsive decision making.49 This personal inconsistency coupled with the institutional
decentralization of the early Russian state intensely politicized the foreign policy making
process and fostered a great deal of competition among opposing bureaucratic institutions and
foreign policy elites for influence over the president and his inner circle, particularly in the
first few years after he assumed office.
Yeltsin was thus at first a very strong proponent of the liberal internationalist agenda
forwarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the primary instrument of Russian
foreign policy making in the early months of 1992. Largely a hold over from the Soviet-era
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian MFA possessed a less formalized operational
philosophy and was less ideologically insulated than other more conservative Russian
decision making bodies, leaving it more receptive to new ideas, particularly the brand of
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liberal internationalism heralded by Foreign Minister Kozyrev.50 Kozyrev helped bolster the
flow of liberal ideas into the Foreign Ministry by creating a deputy staff drawn more from
academia than the staffs of the Soviet period and by actively seeking advice and expertise
from German and American research universities.51 Though this helped stimulate the flow of
ideas and expertise designed to smooth Russia’s integration into the capitalist world
community, the MFA conspicuously lacked information on the near abroad. Though the
ministry had an array of area specialists on, say, Japan or India, they all but lacked experts on
Kazakhstan or Armenia, for example, for the sole reason that, until December 1991, these
places were not foreign countries.52 This partially explains the MFA’s initial mismanagement
and benign neglect of relations with the near abroad that partially led to the liberals’ eventual
delegitimation.
As the MFA waned in influence and prominence towards late 1992 and early 1993,
the initially weakened Ministry of Defense (MoD) and its concomitant intelligence agencies
increasingly consolidated power from the immediate post-Soviet period into 1994.53 This rise
to prominence was strengthened by Yeltsin’s strategic alliance with the key members of the
Russian military. In contrast to the Foreign Ministry, the military and Defence Ministry
remained insulated from the liberalizing effects of “new thinking” and possessed
organizational ideologies largely indistinguishable from those held by their predecessors.54
Thus, the general policy preference among the military preference within the military at the
time was firmly in favor of the nationalists.55 Furthermore, as Yeltsin’s popularity waned in
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response to the emergent failures of the liberal internationalist position in late 1992, he began
granting the MoD a more or less unilateral hand in directing military reform, determining
military doctrine, and dictating security policy towards the near abroad.56 This alliance would
ultimately bear fruit for Yeltsin following the constitutional crisis of October 1993, when his
military-backed attack on parliament allowed him to neutralize key members of his
opposition in parliament and dissolve the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.57
Alongside the military’s rise was the reorganization of several former branches of the
KGB into a new array of intelligence organizations. In a manner much akin to his alliance
with the military, Yeltsin sought to co-opt the support of these intelligence organizations in
order to bolster his domestic political control and aid in his struggle against political
opponents.58 Primary among these was the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) which, under
the fiery leadership of Yevgeni Primakov, became a crucial rival to the MFA as a driver of
policy and a source of intelligence on the near abroad.59 Another important body was the
Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), which was reported to have acted as the primary
director of Russian covert operations in the near abroad, specifically in supplying arms to
combatants in Abkhazia as well as in Chechnya.60 Among others, the Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU) reportedly supported two separate coup attempts in Azerbaijan while the
Federal Border Guards Service (FPS) had, by 1994, troops deployed in Moldova, Tajikistan,
and Abkhazia.61
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Although ultimately dissolved by Yeltsin in October 1993, the Supreme Soviet, under
the influence of speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and the anti-Yeltsin Red-Brown coalition,
exercised a considerable deal of influence over foreign affairs under the pre-1993
constitution.62 The parliamentary Committees on Security and Defence and on International
Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, though generally more moderate than the general
membership, were nonetheless sharply critical of the liberal international ambitions of the
President and MFA which they saw as betraying Russia’s national interests.63 While
somewhat limited in their executive decision making capacity, the nationalists in the Supreme
Soviet proved successful in stoking popular opposition to Yeltsin and in a number of cases
used their legislative power to overtly obstruct attempts by Yeltsin to resolve issues, such as
the withdrawal of troops from conflict zones, through strictly executive means. Their
assertiveness demonstrated further the degree of political decentralization that the new
Russian Federation was prone to in the early years of its existence that contributed to the
confusion in policy articulation.
Another key source of influence, though their direct bearing on policy making is
admittedly limited, is the Russian public. Particularly regarding relations with the near
abroad, many ethnic Russians were disillusioned with the geopolitical realities left by the
breakup of the USSR and remained so for a number of reasons. First, and perhaps most
importantly, following the union’s collapse, some twenty-five million people of
self-proclaimed Russian descent found themselves living outside their country’s borders.64
Moreover, many Russians simply refuse to regard these newly internationalized borders as
legitimate, given the common tendency for Soviet citizens and industrial planners to view the
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Soviet Union’s borders as internal and largely arbitrary. For this reason, many Russians
tended to view Moscow’s relations with the near abroad as issues of domestic rather than
foreign policy.65 These factors, alongside the increasingly disastrous impact of Gaidar’s
economic “shock therapy” on public welfare, facilitated strong public support for nationalist
positions, as evinced by the overwhelming victory of radical nationalists such as Vladimir
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in the December 1993
parliamentary elections.
Ultimately, the debate over policy towards the near abroad fundamentally regards
contentious questions of identity, national sovereignty, and the nature of the new Russian
Federation’s relationship with the former Russian Empire and Soviet republics. Though the
relevant schools of thought diverged greatly in their broader policy prescriptions they
remained united in their conviction that Russia is an erstwhile great power with a
responsibility to contain the spread of conflict throughout Russia’s strategic border region. As
the following historical narratives will attest, a constructivist analysis of Russian intervention
from 1992-1994 demonstrates that while the incidence of Russian intervention often occurred
spontaneously, the onset of structural, domestic, and institutional pressures helped
ideologically driven policy entrepreneurs build a national consensus framing intervention as
an instrument of coercive diplomacy and empowering pragmatic nationalist views on
Russia’s role as an active peacekeeper in the near abroad.
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Chapter Three - Soviet Nationalities Policy
Before turning to the conflicts themselves, it is first crucial to understand how the
politics of ethnicity in the Soviet Union were formalized and institutionalized and how the
breakdown of these arrangements in the late 1980’s created ideal conditions for the
nationalist irredentism and civil conflict that ultimately warranted outside intervention. A
system that originally began as a response to the so called “Nationalities Question,” Soviet
nationalities policy has its roots in pre-revolutionary Russia. Until its collapse in 1917, the
Russian Empire was essentially a massive and contiguous land empire which traditionally
relied on brute force to maintain order on its multi-ethnic southern and eastern peripheries.
The leaders of the Bolshevik movement thus understood well that popular fervor for the
principle of “national self-determination” rendered nationalism a powerful weapon against
the increasingly frail imperial center.66 Although Marxism generally rejects the fundamental
assumptions of nationalism by holding that economic class, rather than the nation, constitutes
the primary cleavage between human societies, the Bolsheviks were extremely successful in
harnessing the inertia of the preexisting nationalist movements throughout Russia’s periphery
to weaken the power of the Tsar and Provisional Government and generate support for
socialism.
Following the success of the revolution, however, the impending disintegration of the
Russian Empire necessitated a new, more formalized answer to the nationalities question that
could satiate popular demands for self-determination while also maintaining the cohesiveness
of the state. Soviet decision makers thus decided upon a federative system according to the
“national-territorial principle,” providing each major nationality with a territorial homeland,
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whether in one of the fifteen union republics, twenty autonomous republics, eight
autonomous oblasts, or eight autonomous okrugs.67 Thus, when the first All-Union-Treaty
was ratified in 1922, the organizational structure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
constituted a voluntary federative union of semi-autonomous ethno-states. At least initially,
these nationality units were granted considerable freedom under Lenin’s policy of
“indigenization” (korenizatsiya), retaining the right to practice their traditional religions,
speak their indigenous languages, and enjoy a considerable degree of local autonomy. The
implicit assumption remained, however, that national attachments and loyalties would
eventually dissipate in favor of a supranational Soviet identity, facilitated by the eventual
construction of a fully integrated political and economic community.68
Such cohesiveness being unforthcoming in the Soviet Union’s early years, Stalin’s
rise to power signalled a much more forceful push towards centralization and Sovietization
which would radically alter the future course and tenor of Soviet nationalities policy. Various
republics and autonomous regions were either administratively demoted or underwent
arbitrary territorial alterations and a vast array of minority ethnic groups suffered systematic
persecution and forcible resettlement through the period during and after World War II.69 In
place of Lenin’s platform of “indigenization” came a forcible Russification campaign aimed
at culturally and linguistically uniting the disparate populations of the USSR while also
discouraging irredentist sentiment at the national unit level. In principle, these policies aimed
to institute a divide et impera approach to mitigating ethnic unrest and mobilizing the whole
of the Soviet populace towards industrialization, modernization, and the building of
socialism. In practice, however, they served to stoke and suppress deep inter-ethnic
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grievances, fuel resentment for central authority, and ultimately set the stage for future ethnic
conflict. The latter of these was accomplished in large part by institutionalization of
nationality as an inescapable aspect of identity for Soviet citizens.
Beginning with the introduction of the Soviet passport system in 1932, the
bureaucratic registration of ethnicity became the centerpiece of Soviet ethnopolitics and
would grow to define citizen-state relationships in the decades following. Citizens were
initially given the option to nationally self identify but were soon denied that right, leaving
the determination of one’s official nationality to the entries of their parents, rendering
ascriptive and immutable a phenomenon widely regarded as a product of conscious
self-identification.70 The Soviet leadership justified this decision on the basis of guaranteeing
special rights to ethnic minorities residing in their ethnic homelands through a system of
institutionalized affirmative action policies. This system was designed to provide preferential
treatment to these “titular nationalities” by granting them elevated access to opportunities in
higher education and professional employment within their homelands.71
It also functioned as a form of ensuring centralized control over otherwise potentially
restive territorially based nationalities. Since roughly the 1950’s, each ethnic homeland was
ruled by indigenous ethnic cadre drawn from the ranks of that region’s titular nationality that
was granted a monopoly over the republic’s mobilizational resources.72 An institutionalized
incentive structure then served to deter indigenous cadres from pursuing potentially
destabilizing primordial ethnic agendas, while the ethnically distinct institutional
stratification system functionally excluded external ethnic entrepreneurs.73 All of these factors
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served to foster the construction of an educated national elite within each republic that was
inherently and inextricably bound to the Soviet center, an arrangement which, under
conditions of steady economic development, ensured considerable stability.
Though Stalin’s death in 1953 and the resulting, albeit brief, period of reformism
under Khrushchev saw Moscow grant limited reparations to formerly persecuted minorities,
the fundamental design of the Soviet ethno-political infrastructure remained intact through
the Brezhnev era. It was not until the deepening of the Soviet Union’s economic crises in the
1980’s and subsequent introduction of social and economic reforms under Mikhail
Gorbachev that the system’s safeguards began to unravel. While Gorbachev himself admitted
to the influence of perestroikain “explod[ing] the illusory peace and harmony which reigned
during the years of stagnation,” it was glasnost that truly brought the nationalities problem to
the forefront of politics in the Soviet Union.74
Roughly translatable to “openness” or “transparency,” glasnostwas a political slogan
referring to an array of policy programs broadly associated with the loosening of censorship
restrictions, allowing the Soviet public, media, and intelligentsia to discuss and investigate
issues previously considered taboo.75 Though Gorbachev justified this new openness as a
means to create a less restricted civil society and more invigorated national dialogue, the
leadership’s virulent condemnation and reexamination of the horrors of Stalinism allowed
previously submerged ethnic grievances to reemerge, particularly among the educated ethnic
elites of the Union Republics.
These seeds of instability were given a chance to grow with the introduction of
“democratization,” the program of political liberalization that quickly became the centerpiece
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of the 
glasnostreform platform in 1988. As preexisting restrictions against mass public
demonstrations and unofficially operated organizations were lifted and the center began
encouraging a freer and more independent press, a vast array of popular movements were
initiated, many of which revolved around issues of ethnic identity and shared grievances.76
Particularly in the union republics, these movements functioned as quasi political parties and
local authorities often began developing close ties with the so called “Popular Fronts” that
appeared in republics such as Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Baltic States.
Ultimately, these political changes, alongside the exacerbation of economic issues that
began to culminate in the late 1980’s disrupted the chain of authority between Moscow and
its ethnic cadres in the union republics, allowing the latter to pursue popular programs
without fear of reprisal from the center. Absent the repressiveness of traditional Soviet rule
and its limited affordance of political rights, open channels of communication, and mobility
within and between its ethnic provinces, the leaders of these newly formed popular
movements, particularly those within ethnically heterogeneous Soviet SSRs, were finally
given the opportunity to address preexisting grievances and petition for change. As the
following case studies will attest, understanding the development of these movements proves
crucial towards understanding the conflicts they bred and the responses those conflicts
eventually garnered from Moscow.
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Chapter Four - Moldova: Transnistria
The brief civil war that erupted in the Republic of Moldova constitutes the first active
deployment of Russian troops in the near abroad in the post-Soviet period. It also retains
significance as among the first foreign policy decisions made unilaterally by the newly
created Russian military to which the civilian government was compelled to acquiesce.
Despite the absence of the central Russian government from the decision making process, the
outcome of the war was crucial both in securing key Russian interests and shaping domestic
resolve on Russia’s role in ethnic conflicts on its periphery and ultimately its approach to the
near abroad writ large.
Historical Background
Situated on the banks of the Dniester river, the area currently known as the Republic
of Moldova has a limited history of territorial sovereignty. In its original formation, the
medieval principality of Moldavia stretched from the Carpathian mountains to the east bank
of the Dniester, representing the bulk of Romania’s current territory. The advance of the
Ottoman empire in the sixteenth century subjected the majority Romanian speaking peasant
population to centuries of Turkish occupation and established the Dniester as the natural
border with Russia, which began a military occupation of the river’s east bank in 1792.77 The
portion of Moldova located east of the Dniester river and west of the Prut, more recently
referred to as Bessarabia, remained under Ottoman control until it was annexed by Russia in
1812.78 Forced internal migration radically changed the population of Bessarabia to reflect a
77
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newly diverse ethnic makeup consisting of Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians in the cities and
townships of the region, dwarfing demographically the ethnic Moldovans, who were
concentrated heavily in the countryside.
Meanwhile, as the Guberniaof Bessarabia grew more Russified, the remainder of old
Moldavia joined with Wallachia in 1859 to form the first Romanian state. Though the
Romanian-speaking populations in Romania and Bessarabia developed their modern ethnic
identities under distinctly different cultural conditions, the chaos of the Russian civil war
provided Romania with the opportunity to lay claim on its Romanian speaking neighbor to
the east. The 1918 territorial transferral declaring that Bessarabia belonged “historically and
territorially to Romania,” recognized by the Western powers at the Paris Peace conference in
1920, began the two-decade long period of Romanian rule over Bessarabia.79 The strip of
land along the western bank of the Dniester has by contrast, no history of territorial union
with Romania, aside from a brief wartime occupation from 1941-1944. In what ultimately
constituted a response to Bessarabia’s merger with Romania, Stalin reorganized the east bank
region into the “Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic,” which functioned from
1924-1940 as an administrative subunit of the Ukrainian SSR before being incorporated into
the newly created Moldavian SSR, created during the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia
following the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany.80
Moldova and Transnistria under the Soviet Union
Though forestalled temporarily by Nazi invasion in 1941 and subsequent Romanian
occupation, the reincorporation of Bessarabia into the MSSR allowed for the full
Sovietization of the Dniester-Prut region. Transnistria, however, already having undergone
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the transformative effects of collectivization and Stalin’s five-year-plans during the 1920’s
and 1930’s, maintained privileged status within the post-war MSSR, far exceeding the west
bank region in its industrial productivity and close party-based affiliations with Moscow.
Although it only accounted for twelve percent of the Republic’s territory, Transnistria
became a crucial base for the Soviet defense and heavy industry sectors, employing nearly 80
percent of its population in the industrial, construction, and service sectors in the years
following the second world war.81 Communist party members hailing from the MASSR also
retained dominance in Moldova’s post-war power apparatus practically throughout the Soviet
period, fueling tensions between the “Moscow communists,” often times ethnic Russians and
Ukrainians, and the “home communists,” leaders from the Bessarabian communist
underground deemed politically suspect by Moscow.82 Thus, by the 1960’s, two thirds of
Moldova’s Communist party members were either Russian or Ukrainian.83
As an important industrial powerhouse ruled by an increasingly urbanized and
centre-loyal party elite, Transnistria was home to a far more demographically diverse
population than the remainder of Moldova. According to the 1989 census, Moldovans
represented 39.9 percent of Transnistria’s 546,000 inhabitants, Ukrainians following with
28.3 percent and Russians, 25.5 percent.84 These figures appear to suggest the demographic
dominance of ethnic Moldovans, although they worked mainly in agriculture and comprised
only a small fraction of Transnistria’s urban population which itself was considerably more
Russophone. Russians remained a minority in Transnistria’s industrial cities, whereas
Russian speakers comprised nearly 75 percent of the urban population, in comparison with
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the 35 percent of Moldova’s population they represented as a whole.85 This Russophone
population was thus deeply and quintessentially Soviet and maintained practically inseverable
ties with the Soviet center, the Communist Party, and, above all, the military, whose heavy
presence in Transnistria via the Soviet Fourteenth Army was central to the economic and
social life of the region.86
The remainder of Moldova, however, though reaping partially the benefits of
Transnistria’s industrial productivity, remained largely rural and underdeveloped.
Disproportionately consolidated in the poorer agricultural sector, ethnic Moldovans were
vastly underrepresented in administrative and industry related professions. In fact, by 1977,
non-Moldovans constituted roughly 54 percent of the industrial workforce, 57 percent of state
leadership positions, and 68 percent of those employed in the sciences.87 The stagnation of
the Soviet economy during the 1980’s exacerbated Moldova’s already dire economic
situation, particularly following Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign, a central planning error
which proved disastrous for Moldova’s agricultural industry given its heavy reliance on the
production of wine as a staple export.88 Thus, by the late 1980’s, ethnic Moldovans were
progressively forced into competition with non-Moldovans for an increasingly limited pool of
state issued jobs and benefits.
Political Mobilization Under Glasnost
In light of these worsening economic circumstances, alongside grim realities of
ethnic favoritism ingrained in the social fabric of the republic, glasnost’s“opening” of the
political arena to non-centrally-sanctioned organizations was a driving force behind the
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conflict spiral that unfurled between Chisinau and Tiraspol. The emergence of a strong
nationalist popular front successfully framed the republic’s socio-economic ills in explicitly
ethnic terms, garnering considerable support in the process. Despite its beginnings in early
1988 as the Communist Party affiliated and initially pro-Gorbachev Democratic Movement in
Support of Perestroika, the organization known as the Moldovan Popular Front by mid-1989
proved successful in mobilizing multiple hundred thousand person crowds, gathered with the
intention of forwarding an ethnic Moldovan agenda.89 Among the primary demands of the
MPF was the institutionalization of Moldovan as the state language.90
This demand was politically charged as it stood to disenfranchise the whole of the
Russophone population from their traditionally dominant position in Moldovan society. The
implications were considerable; place names and public signage were to be changed,
Moldovan would replace Russian as the language of government and industry, and, perhaps
most importantly, all political leaders, managers, and service workers were given five years
to obtain full bilingualism.91 While certain provisions for exemption were afforded to
Russophone concentrated areas, the language law nonetheless inspired mass opposition as
Russian speakers from cities throughout both Transnistria and Bessarabia mobilized in
protest. It was the Transnistrian elites, however, whom these laws most acutely threatened.
The goal of the Transnistrian elites was primarily to create a security dilemma for
both sides in order to preserve and increase their own power. In Transnistria, these elites were
largely composed of the raionexecutive committees and the coordinating committees of
industrial concerns who coalesced around the leader of the opposition movement, Igor
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Smirnov.92 A recent emigre to Moldova from Ukraine, Smirnov used his position as an
industrial manager to ride the tide of anti-Moldovan sentiment in his city of Tiraspol and in
August 1989 was elected to the chair of the United Council of Work Collectives (OSTK in
the Russian acronym), the body in charge of organizing workers’ strikes.93 The OSTK was
extremely influential in mobilizing on-the-ground support for the Russophone agenda,
organizing the January 1990 referendum on Transnistrian autonomy in which nearly 96
percent of respondents voted in favor of greater Transnistrian autonomy and, if necessary, the
establishment of an entirely independent Transnistrian Republic.94 This was but the first
among a series of increasingly provocative actions taken by the east bank leadership in
response to increasing chauvinism in the west.
Escalation of Hostilities and the Outbreak of Violence
Tensions between Chisinau and Tiraspol were solidified following the 25 February
1990 parliamentary elections, as a result of which various nationalist representatives from the
Popular Front gained a majority in Parliament. 95 This victory occurred amidst increasingly
frequent calls in Chisinau for closer ties between Moldova and Romania and open
consideration of a full territorial merger. Though such plans were widely opposed by
pro-Moldovan-independence factions, including President Mircea Snegur, the pro-Romanian
factions in parliament succeeded in exacerbating fears amongst the Russophone population of
Transnistria of being forcibly reincorporated into Romania.96 Such fears fueled the 2
September 1990 decision by a local council of Transnistrian authorities to declare a separate
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Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic, thus formally rejecting Moldovan legal authority east of
the Dniester.97
Though reneged by Chisinau, this decision ultimately proved decisive in precipitating
the first round of armed confrontations that would ensue between Transistrian and
Moldova-backed groups. The first of these broke out on 2 November 1990 in the west bank
city of Dubossary, where Moldovan police attempting to liberate the town’s district council,
courthouse, and attorney’s office which were being held by members of the predominantly
Russophone population, opened fire on the crowds and killed three people.98 These events
occurred the same day as clashes between Moldovan volunteer detachments and
Transnistrian forces in the west bank city of Bendery, situated directly across the Dniester
from Tiraspol.99 Almost immediately, Transnistrian elites began using their control over the
local news media to invoke the “victims of Dubossory” and stoke anti-Moldovan sentiment
amongst the Russophone population in the east bank, prompting mirrored responses from
Chisinau and thus deepening the security dilemma.100
Although the presence of Soviet Interior Ministry troops in Moldova was initially
effective in preventing the outbreak of open hostilities, minor clashes between Moldovan and
Transnistrian irregulars grew increasingly frequent over the course of 1990 and 1991. The
failure of the August 1991 coup proved instrumental in disrupting this equilibrium. Given the
Moldovan Communist party’s opposition to the coup alongside their weakness, the August
putsch prompted parliament to declare Moldova an independent republic days later on 27
August 1991, simultaneously seizing all Soviet and party assets on Moldovan territory.101
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Chisinau also oversaw the abduction and extradition of Igor Smirnov from Kiev, using his
support for the illegal coup attempt as justification. The Transnistrian leadership’s response
was to blockade the rail lines to Moldova while threatening to cut off Moldova’s access to
Transnistrian gas and electricity until Smirnov’s release.102 Upon his eventual release,
Smirnov hurriedly organized a referendum on Transnistrian independence from Moldova.
While the ultimate objective of “independence within the USSR” was impossible
without the signing of a new all-Union treaty, key legislative actions had unfolded in
Moscow which empowered the aims of secessionist groups throughout the union. In April
1991 Politburo member Anatolii Lukyanov, an avid and vocal supporter of the Transnistrian
cause as a base from which to prevent Moldova’s drift from Soviet influence, petitioned for
the inclusion of a clause in the new Union treaty draft stating:

“that in the event that any republic refuses to sign the Union Treaty, and autonomous
republics and regions, as well as territories with compactly settled national groups
express themselves against such a refusal, they then have the right to enter the USSR
as independent subjects of the federation, with an appropriate status …”103

Moreover, the pro-independence outcome of the referendum succeeded in confirming
the popular mandate behind the Transnistrian authorities’ Russophone agenda and validated
their attempts to secure their region’s autonomy by any means necessary against anticipated
Moldovan incursions.104 Riding the tide of the successful referendum and his subsequent
election to the presidency of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) in December
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1991, Smirnov began his “creeping putsch” armed campaign to use the recently mobilized
Dnester Guard forces to establish de facto control over the whole of Transnistria, targeting
primarily cities and townships harboring pro-Moldovan police forces.105 Dubossary proved
the site of yet another escalation in hostilities when Moldovan police attempted to disarm
Transnistrian regulars that entered the city on 18 December 1991, constituting the first of in
series of major armed confrontations in and around the west bank cities of Dubossary and
Bendery that escalated through the spring and summer of 1992.106
Early Russian Involvement: Conflict Management or Conflict Promotion?
Particularly given its weakness in the immediate post-Soviet period, Moscow
remained initially ambivalent regarding the strategy it aimed to implement in regards to
Transnistria. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 merely served to deepen
divisions within Moscow over the Transnistrian issue as bloodshed between Chisinau and
Tiraspol intensified into 1992. Seeking to avoid the escalation of such bloody ethnic conflict
as was already underway in Nagorno-Karabakh while also hoping to retain Russian influence
in the region and protect the status of the Transnistrian Russophones who remained loyal to
Moscow, authorities in the newly formed Russian Federation were split on how best to broker
a peace settlement that would grant concessions to Moldova but not threaten the
Transnistrians. In light of other more pressing issues, namely the establishment of joint CIS
directives and the managed implementation of economic “shock therapy,” Yeltsin maintained
almost complete silence on the conflict until early spring.
Amidst official indecision in Moscow, the former Soviet Fourteenth Army,
headquartered in Tiraspol, proved instrumental in driving Russian support for the breakaway
republic from beneath, as their forces coordinated closely with Transnistrian efforts to
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mobilize and consolidate control over the east bank territories. Reported collaboration
between the Fourteenth Army and Transnistria dates back to as early March 1991 but reached
a critical point following the August Putsch and subsequent creation of a Transnistrian militia
force the following September.107 Alongside training and logistics support, the Fourteenth
Army also reportedly oversaw the transfer of as many as 20,000 firearms to the Transnistrian
forces.108 Collaboration between the two factions was so close that the notoriously corruptible
Commander of the Fourteenth Army Genadii Yakovlev was appointed Transnistrian Minister
of Defence by Smirnov himself in December 1991.109
Transnistrian forces were also abetted by incoming Cossack revivalists sponsored by
pro-Cossack, Russian-based enterprises in Sochi and Rostov arriving with the intention of
defending “Russia.”110 These Cossacks,111 alongside the mass defections from the Fourteenth
Army, were granted considerable moral support from voices within Russia, namely Russian
Vice President Alexander Rutskoi and the Nationalist newspapers Den’ and Krasnaya
Zvezda, 
the later of which began actively signalling its recognition of the Transnistrian
“republic,” despite its illegality, as early as 1990.112 This demonstration of clear favoritism for
the Transnistrian cause in Moscow, alongside Gorbachev’s prior weaponization of the
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Transnistria issue to coerce President Snegur into signing the new Union treaty throughout
1990 and 1991, had poisoned relations between Moscow and Chisinau and rendered the
secural of an equitable peace arrangement upon the flare in hostilities in early 1992
considerably difficult for Yeltsin.
Despite active and vocal support for the Transnistrian cause in Moscow, Russian
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev led the liberal internationalist attempt to genuinely
reestablish Russia’s neutrality in a multilateral conflict mediation process. During a session
of the OSCE in March 1992, Kozyrev proposed a settlement that would enlist the support of
both Romania and Ukraine and provide Transnistria a legal path to independence in the event
of Moldova’s merger with Romania.113 On 1 April, Yeltsin sought to bolster this progress by
announcing the transferral of the Fourteenth Army to formal Russian jurisdiction. Hoping to
quell the rapid flow of defectors and weapons to the Transnistrian militia, Yeltsin also sought
to reestablish the Fourteenth Army as a neutral military presence capable of contributing a
functional role to the process as a peacekeeping force. Though in light of the fact that nearly
all the Fourteenth Army’s roughly 6,000 troops and the majority of its officers were
permanent Transnistrian residents, their proposed use as a peacekeeping force was both
politically unacceptable to Moldova and practically untenable given their intrinsically
pro-Transnistrian bias.114
The precariousness of the liberal internationalist minimal intervention platform was
further compromised by Vice President Rutskoi, whose mounting opposition to Yeltsin’s and
Kozyrev’s attempts to retain Russia’s neutrality in the conflict culminated in his unsanctioned
April visit to Tiraspol. Mirroring positions forwarded by the anti-Yeltsin nationalist bloc in
the Russian parliament, Rutskoi called for Moscow to recognize the sovereignty and
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independence of the PMR and established humanitarian justifications for Russian
intervention which hinged on their responsibility to “defend Russians and other citizens,”
referring to the Sovietized Russophones of the east bank.115 Rutskoi’s stance was typical of
conservative nationalists in parliament and in the Russian armed forces, many of whom
viewed the possibility of Romanian involvement in the conflict mediation process as a grave
geopolitcal misstep that would compromise Russia’s traditionally dominant position in the
“near abroad.”116
In light of Yeltsin’s ambivalence on the course of action in March-April 1992,
however, Moldova perceived Rutskoi’s line to represent the official policy of Russia on
Transnistria. Thus, calls from Chisinau calling on Russia to cease its support for pro-PMR
Cossack and Fourteenth Army military detachments grew increasingly frequent in May and
June. Invoking the fact that international law rendered the deployment of the Fourteenth
Army in Moldova an illegal occupation of sovereign territory by a foreign army, President
Snegur demanded on 12 May that Yeltsin order the withdrawal of the Army from Moldova.117
Similar calls further intensified following orders from the Fourteenth Army leadership to
“answer fire with fire” on 19 May in response to increasing attacks on Russian army units by
Moldovan artillery units.118
Meanwhile, the nationalist-dominated Ministry of Defence firmly emphasized that
retaliatory actions were taken only in response to attacks against Russian military
installations or compounds, attempts to seize Russian weapons, or credible threats to army
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personnel.119 The MoD also expressed the official view that the Fourteenth Army maintained
its neutrality throughout the conflict and that any allegations holding that it had participated
in aggressive actions against Moldova were entirely lacking in credibility.120 The newly
inaugurated Minister of Defence, Pavel Grachev, however, expressly rejected the inclusion of
Romania in the peace negotiations, echoing Rutskoi’s call for the protection of “the rights of
Russian citizens and of persons who identify themselves with Russia ethnically and
culturally.”121
Russian Intervention and Subsequent “Peacekeeping” Efforts
Though Yeltsin’s decision to nationalize the Fourteenth Army had done little to limit
the flow of arms and personnel to the Transnistrian guard, he was simulataneoulsy aware that
any attempt by Russia to reassert direct control over the Army’s stores might spark mutiny
within its ranks and risk the wholesale defection of the Fourteenth Army to Transnistria.
Nonetheless, Yeltsin formally ceded to pressure from Snegur and the liberal internationalists
seeking to limit Russian entanglement in the conflict and to whom Yeltsin owed a large
degree of his popular support in those early months, leading him to announce the withdrawal
of the Fourteenth Army from Moldova in late May 1992.122 Unfortunately, this announcement
was never officiated and merely served to intensify the struggle between both sides to gain
access to the Army’s vast weapons stores.
This decision also in part facilitated the rapid intensification of fighting that occured
in June over the west bank city of Bendery. Though recently incorporated into the PMR via
local referendum, Bendery was home to a sizeable pro-Moldovan police force that had
frequently struggled with the pro-Tiraspol militia that presumed control over the township.
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Chisinau invoked a call from the city for the defense of this municipal police force from
Transnistrian harassment as the pretext for their 19 June 1992 armed advance on Bendery
aimed at the “restoration of the legal organs of power” in the city.123 Following Chisinau’s
initial armed advance, PMR forces, with considerable personnel and artillery support from
the Fourteenth Army, quickly retaliated and overpowered the ill-equipped Moldovan military,
allowing the Dnester Guards to successfully retake the city by 21 June.124
The Ministry of Defence conceded that the PMR defence of Bendery constituted the
first active assault against Moldovan forces in the course of the conflict involving Fourteenth
Army personnel.125 It is difficult, however, to determine the degree to which Moscow ordered
this ultimate decision to intervene. Yeltsin had only days earlier expressed his commitment to
using Russia’s influence to “stop the bloodshed” in Transnistria, but by summer 1992,
communication between Moscow and the Fourteenth Army had largely broken down.126
Furthermore, there is no accessible evidence of any advanced planning by either the Kremlin
or MoD for the use of the Fourteenth Army in the conflict.127 Therefore, many believe that the
Fourteenth Army acted unilaterally in its support of Transnistrian forces, though there is
debate surrounding who can be realistically held accountable for the Army’s actions.
Some have held that the Fourteenth Army’s commander, Lieutenant-General Iurii
Netkachev, made the decision to intervene himself.128 Such claims, however, ignore the fact
that Netkachev was widely unpopular in the army’s ranks and proved largely ineffectual
during his short term in command.129 Appointed with the express purpose of limiting
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Fourteenth Army engagements with Moldovan forces and stemming the flow of arms to the
PMR militia, Netkachev gradually lost the confidence of his troops by hamfistedly seeking to
fulfil the CIS directive ordering the Fourteenth Army to turn over its arms to the Moldovan
government, an untenable demand given that the demobilization process following the fall of
the Soviet Union had left the Army increasingly concentrated in Transnistria.130
In fact, most sources point out that, on the eve of the crisis in Bendery, Netkachev had
been functionally replaced as commander of the Fourteenth Army by former Afghan war
hero, Russian General Alexander Lebed.131 A Yeltsin supporter during the 1991 coup but a
close associate of Grachev’s by mid-1992, Lebed had been sent to Transnistria to assess the
involvement of the Fourteenth Army and verify information regarding the theft and
transferral of weapons. However, shortly following the outbreak of the crisis, Lebed assumed
operational control of the Fourteenth Army and personally oversaw the defeat of Moldovan
forces, as the majority of the scholarly literature will emphasize.
As circumstantial evidence points out, however, there is a great deal of evidence to
suggest that the Fourteenth’s Army’s counterattack was directly coordinated by the defence
ministry. The Russian newspaper Rossiiskie Vesti in February 1994 wrote, “only now,
summing up the facts have we come to understand: every step of the Army’s commander
[Lebed] was authorized by the hierarchy of Russia’s Ministry of Defence,” confirming the
prior admissions of State Council member Sergei Stankevich to similar effect.132 The timing
of the attack also raises suspicions regarding the degree to which entire engagement may
have been staged by the military. Less than a day before the initial Moldovan advance,
Yeltsin had given a forceful speech to US congress highlighting Russia’s newborn friendship
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with the West and commitment to liberal norms and values, a moment which came to
represent the high point of the liberal internationalist model.133 Considering the course of
events on the ground and Yeltsin’s temporary absence from direct policy making given his
being abroad, there remains a degree of likelihood that not only was the decision to intervene
undertaken unilaterally by the MoD, or at least strategically executed by the Dnester Guards,
that it was likely carried out with the express intention of deligitimating the government’s
diplomatic and reformist platform.
Intervention as Developing Domestic Consensus on the Use of Force
Regardless of the degree of their preordainment, the events in Bendery had a series of
important implications for the course of later developments. Firstly, the Russian government
and public perceived the Fourteenth Army’s victory as a military and political success.
Though the battle resulted in casualties approaching 500,134 General Lebed’s decisive
leadership had demonstrated the vastly superior firepower of the Russia-backed PMR forces
and had reestablished the “neutrality” of the Fourteenth Army by returning it to its barracks
and preventing the further theft of its weaponry.135 And while the loss of Bendery had
weakened Chisinau’s position to demand concessions from Tiraspol, Snegur saw Lebed as a
legitimate mediating figure whose success in stemming the unrestricted flow of arms to
Transnistrian forces considerably mitigated the security dilemma that had plagued the earlier
stages of the conflict.136
Perhaps most important were the implications that this victory had on the position of
the liberal internationalists. A great deal of this has to do with the general absence of Western
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response to the actions of the Fourteenth Army and the degree to which it discredited the
basis upon which most liberal internationalists opposed the use of force, namely that to defy
the Western code of “good conduct” would jeopardize Russia’s attempts to integrate
economically with the wealthy G-7 states.137 This also notified the Russian elite establishment
of the degree of latitude they possessed in pursuing similar actions throughout the near
abroad. As former foreign policy advisor to Yeltsin Andranik Migranyan notes, “the West
feared that any strong response to Russia over the 14th Army's actions ... might overburden
the ruling democrats, and therefore refrained from any serious demarches against Russia.”138
Unfortunately, their inaction ultimately bore the opposite effect; despite their initial
condemnation of Fourteenth Army actions, Yeltsin and Kozyrev were forced to fall in line
with the events that unfolded on the ground and begin campaigning more forcefully for
Russia’s responsibility in managing the conflict directly. In late June Yeltsin claimed that that
Russia needed to demonstrate to Snegur that Russia has the “force” to “protect people and
stop bloodshed” in Moldova, as Kozyrev responded to Moldova’s 8 July request for a CSCE
peacekeeping operation by saying “this is, after all, our zone of responsibility, and it is we
who should find the forces to play the disengagement role.”139 Again, hesitance on the part of
the CSCE to involve itself in the peacekeeping process strengthened the resolve of
nationalists in Moscow and ultimately forced Chisinau to the bargaining table. After being
forced to sue for a Moscow-dominated peace, Snegur eventually agreed to talks with Russia,
setting the groundwork for the Yeltsin-Snegur agreement of 21 July 1992. Alongside a
separate statute declaring Transnistria’s “special status” in Moldova, the agreement officiated
the eventual deployment of a joint Russian-Moldovan-Dnestr peacekeeping force on 29 July.
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While liberals such as Kozyrev still opposed direct intervention, the events in
Bendery and their international and domestic reception had consolidated consensus around
Russia’s right to use of force as a peacekeeper in the near abroad. With time, peacekeeping
became used increasingly as a tool to achieve exclusive Russian interests in the near abroad.
The record in Moldova helps to support this case. For example, Moldova’s repeated requests
for UN and CSCE participation in talks over the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army were
repeatedly forestalled by parliament until the reformation of the army’s units into the
Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, currently deployed in the northern
Transnistrian town of Cobasna.140 Moscow also repeatedly levied the threat of disbanding the
Fourteenth Army (with the implicit assumption being the de facto transferral of the force to
Transnistrian control) and the imposition of a heavy tariff structure against Moldova as an
initially non-CIS state in order to coerce Chisinau into reconsidering its anti-Moscow
position. These combined pressures eventually bore fruit and by January 1993 public support
in Chisinau for reunification with Romania had sharply deteriorated and in late October the
Moldovan parliament voted to formally join the CIS economic union. 141
As shall be evident in later case studies, the gradual development of Russia’s
approach to the conflict in Moldova highlights the increasing influence of the military as a
leading actor in future interventions. The MFA’s initial pursuit of diplomacy as a form of
conflict resolution was ultimately replaced by a more assertive and coercive military strategy
aimed at securing long term Russian military presence in Moldova, excluding Romania from
the peace process, and ensuring Moldova’s membership in the CIS. This chain of events also
signals the beginning of the end for liberal influence over Russian foreign policy formulation.
This development will be traced further in the following case study on the Georgia.
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Chapter V - Georgia: South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Introduction
A small and mountainous country nestled between the North and South Caucasus,
Georgia emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union eager to escape its colonial legacies yet
remained stunted by its ethnic heterogeneity, economic underdevelopment, and contentious
relationship with its paternalistic superpower neighbor, Russia. These weaknesses set the
stage for the intense political instability, civil war, and partial territorial dismemberment that
swiftly followed Georgia’s attainment of independence in April 1991. This section will
primarily concern itself with outlining the two distinct yet interrelated conflicts that broke out
in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with particular emphasis on Russia’s role in
their respective outcomes and their role as further test cases for the efficacy and palatability
of Russian “peacekeeping” interventions.
Though unique in their origins, both conflicts centrally involve the reactionary efforts
of marginalized and localized ethnic groups historically native to the Georgian land seeking
independence from the newly created Georgian state. Such efforts in both regions were met
with militarized resistance from Georgia and resulted in a series of armed conflicts between
1991 and 1994 - none of which have succeeded in officially settling the territorial disputes.
Furthermore, despite being internationally recognized as territorial provinces within Georgia,
the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have largely retained their de facto independence
since 1993 and 1992, respectively.
The case of Georgia remains pertinent to this study for a number of reasons. First, the
flow of events in both conflicts, particularly South Ossetia, are noticeably synchronized with
those in Moldova, reflecting the degree to which events that unfolded across the FSU and
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their reception in Moscow were deeply interlocked at this time. The peacekeeping mission to
South Ossetia also stands out as Russia’s first successful peacekeeping attempt and provides
a crucial template upon which other future Russian-led peacekeeping efforts would be based.
Moreover, the war in Abkhazia, particularly given its timing, proves crucial for mapping the
gradual shift in Russian foreign policy goals away from Kozyrev’s internationalist agenda
and towards a more coercive and nationalist approach. The deployment of a Russia-led CIS
peacekeeping force in May 1994 represents the culmination of a gradually developing
intervention strategy aimed at leveraging conflict resolution against the Georgian government
in order to fulfill the key security interests of the Russian Federation, namely the
establishment of exclusive Russian basing rights on Georgian territory, Georgia’s entrance
into the CIS, the stabilization of the North Caucasus, and the prevention of potentially
destabilizing foreign incursions.
Antiquity into the Premodern Period
Though the backdrop to these conflicts rests fundamentally in the development of
ethnic frictions and their eventual explosion following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
development of these ethnic frictions stems equally from Soviet policy as it does from
conflictual ethnocultural histories that characterize Georgia’s regional and demographic
fissures. Historical records of Georgia as a discrete polity date back to the eleventh century,
when the name Sakartvelo, the Georgian word meaning “the place of the Georgians,” first
appears. Georgian statehood, however, traces much further back into the pre-Christian period,
beginning when Parnevazi, the first Georgian monarch, conquered Colchis, the ancient
kingdom encompassing the majority of coastal western Georgia, including the current day
municipal regions of Abkhazia, Guria, Imeretia, and Svaneti.142
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The first pre-modern manifestation of Georgia as a unitary state followed in the
eleventh century C.E. when an influential Abkhazian prince ruling over Colchis inherited the
majority of the remaining Georgian lands to the east, creating the kingdom of Kartli.143 This
period is often referred to as the “Golden age” of medieval Georgia, a zenith of Georgian
cultural and political achievement that flourished for over two centuries, only to be thwarted
by Mongol invasions beginning in the thirteenth century.144 Though the eventual retreat of the
Mongols allowed Georgia to regain its independence, internal conflict beginning in the
mid-fifteenth century rendered Georgia geographically divided across its east-west axis,
leaving it subject to further fragmentation under foreign rule for much of its pre-modern
history.145 Indirect Safavid rule in Georgia’s eastern provinces and Ottoman control over the
western coastal lands began shortly thereafter and continued until the expansion of Russia
into the Caucasus towards the end of the sixteenth century.146 Though Russian rule in the
Caucasus was by no means quiescent, the revocation of Abkhazia’s autonomous status in
1864 sparked a series of violent protests in Abkhazia suppressed by Russia with extreme
force, sending thousands of Abkhazians into exile in Turkey.147
When Georgia finally regained independence in 1918 amidst the violence and anarchy
of the Russian revolution, Abkhazians, through the pro-Georgian and Menshevik Abkhaz
People’s Council, began to press for autonomous regional status within a de facto union with
Georgia.148 Political and diplomatic differences, however, soon soured relations between
Georgia and the Abkhaz People’s Council and the two remained engaged in intermittent
conflict until the Soviet invasion of Georgia in 1921.149 Meanwhile, the South Ossetians
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conducted a series of Bolshevik-backed uprisings against Menshevik Georgian rule, leaving
death tolls in the thousands and forcing nearly twenty thousand South Ossetians into North
Ossetia to escape reprisal.150
Georgia Under the Soviet Union
Upon the incorporation of Georgia into the Soviet Union, special territorial
arrangements were created for the Ossetians and Abkhaz. Ossetians received a homeland
within Georgia in the form of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. Although formally
isolated from the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast located in the Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), Ossetians from both regions enjoyed considerable
mobility and were largely able to remain cross-border links. 151 Furthermore, as a largely
mountainous region, South Ossetia was suitable for neither industry nor mass agricultural
endeavors and thus was not subject to the demographic restructuring that many other ethnic
homelands experienced under Stalin.152 Therefore, the ethnic situation in South Ossetia
throughout much of the Soviet period proved relatively stable.
The situation in Abkhazia proved far more complex. In contrast to South Ossetia,
Abkhazia was initially granted status as an ethnic republic territorially and administratively
separate from Georgia. Months later, however, Abkhazia signed away certain of its
“sovereign” powers in a bilateral treaty with Georgia.153 The treaty itself was largely
symbolic at the time, particularly given that both republics were subordinate to Moscow as
well as party to the short-lived Transcaucasian Republic which then encompassed Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In 1931, however, Abkhazia was formally stripped of its Union
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Republic status by Stalin, himself an ethnic Georgian, and was demoted to an Autonomous
Republic within the Georgian SSR.154
This betrayal, alongside Stalin’s draconian Russification and collectivization policies,
devastated Georgia’s minority communities. The Abkhazian alphabet was “Georgianized,”
native language schools were closed throughout Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Stalin’s
five-year-plans drew in large numbers of Russian and Mingrelian Georgian agricultural
workers to work in Abkhazia, diluting the Abkhazian demographic presence.155 Though
Stalin’s death signalled a mild reversal of the more repressive of these centralization policies,
Georgian preeminence persisted and reinforced minority demands for increased political and
cultural representation. The Abkhaz in particular were extremely vocal and staged over five
separate sets of major public demonstrations over fifty years, the last of which explicitly
demanded the transferral of Abkhazia to the Russian SSR.156 Tbilisi responded in 1978 with a
series of concessions aimed at rebuilding the infrastructure-poor region while also agreeing to
permit a greater degree of Abkhazian cultural expression through the creation of Abkhazian
language television broadcasts and the founding of an Abkhaz State University.157 By 1989,
however, the Abkhaz population of Abkhazia comprised only 17.8 percent of the population
against 45.7 percent share of Georgians and a disproportionately large settlement of ethnic
Russians.158 Thus Abkhaz fears of gradual Georgianization and potential ethnic extinction
persisted despite these largely symbolic concessions, allowing ethnic tensions to ferment well
into the 1980’s.
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Glasnost and the Georgian Nationalist Movement
These minority grievances were complicated by Georgians’ own troubled self image
and sense of ethnic insecurity. Having been subjected to foreign incursions from the north,
south and west for centuries, Georgian desires for cultural self-preservation have frequently
inhibited their ability to sympathize with the grievances of their minority cohabitants. Thus,
with increased mobilizational freedoms afforded by Glasnost, Georgian nationalist
demonstrations arose in the mid 1980’s and, though initially preoccupied by environmental
and subnational issues, eventually grew more radical and chauvinistic in their glorification of
Georgian national pride and denunciation of continued Soviet rule, targeting specifically the
growth and increased influence of minority groups.159 Though the Georgian government
responded to certain demands of the growing number of extremist nationalist groups, the
intensely anti-Soviet tenor of the Georgian primordialists160 soon eclipsed the movement and
spawned considerable instability within the republic.
It was amidst this political atmosphere that the Abkhaz separatists began their
secessionist campaign. Beginning with a formal letter sent to the Nineteenth All-Union Party
Conference in June 1988 and the formation of an Abkhazian Popular Forum in November,
the forum’s representatives repeatedly called on Moscow to recognize Abkhazia as a full
Union republic throughout the spring of 1989, eschewing the less provocative path of simply
pursuing increased sovereignty.161 The April protests of that year proved to be a watershed
moment for the Georgian nationalists, whose visceral and vocal opposition to Abkhaz
independence soon morphed into explicitly anti-Soviet demonstrations which drew in a
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Soviet military response, leading to the massacre of 19 Georgian citizens.162 Far from
stabilizing the situation, the massacre instead reaffirmed Georgian fears of Moscow’s
anti-Georgian agenda and intensified their opposition to the Abkhaz independence
movement, which was increasingly seen as the primary internal threat to Georgia’s pursuit of
independence. Especially potent were fears that Moscow might weaponize the plight of the
Abkhazians and South Ossetians in order to sabotage the Georgian secessionist movement,
fears that soon proved to be rooted more in reality than in paranoia.
Gamsakhurdia and the Conflict in South Ossetia
As irredentist fervor grew in both republics, several major events occured on the eve
of and throughout 1990 which secured Georgia’s path to independence. The first of these
regards the Georgian parliament’s move to annul the 1921-1922 agreement authorizing
Soviet control over Georgia.163 Though this did not mark Georgia’s official departure from
the Soviet Union, it constituted a major victory for Georgian opposition forces in that it
secured their long term goal of electoral reform, authorized by the Georgian Supreme Soviet
in August 1990, and set the terms for open parliamentary elections to be held the following
October. The results of these elections signalled the departure of Georgia’s communist
leadership from power and marked an overwhelming victory for the Round Table for
National Liberation, a hardline Georgian nationalist party whose leader, Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, a known Soviet dissident and Georgian hyper-nationalist, was appointed
speaker of parliament. Among the primary goals of the newly empowered government was to
pursue a series of nationalistic legislative efforts centered around the institutionalization of
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the Georgian language and redefinition of citizenship along explicitly ethnic Georgian lines.
164

Gamsakhurdia also moved swiftly to reassert control over the restive regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He responded swiftly to the South Ossetian Popular Front’s
declaration of secession from the Georgian SSR on 10 November 1989 by reducing the
SOAO to a common Georgian administrative unit and reverting the name back to the former
feudal Georgian regionym of Samachablo.165 Following parliament's ruling, skirmishes broke
out in the region’s capital of Tskhinvali after a group of roughly 30,000 Georgian nationalists
- alongside several illegal armed formations - marched on the city in counterprotest to
Ossetian picketers.166 In the bloodshed that lasted intermittently from November 1989 to
January 1990, six people died and over five hundred were wounded.167 The Georgian
government quickly moved to declare a state of emergency in the region and initiated a
blockade on the shared border. South Ossetia’s response was to appeal to Moscow for aid.
Given Gorbachev’s position of noninterference, based on fears that active involvement would
hasten Georgia’s drift from Moscow and inspire other national independence movements
across the union, the South Ossetians were left to rely on little but aid from North Ossetia,
providing the only source of food and fuel for the region following Tbilisi’s blockade.
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In January 1991, Gamsakhurdia ordered a detachment of 3,000 Georgian Interior
Ministry troops supported by Georgian nationalist irregulars with the intention of suppressing
the Ossetian independence movement once and for all. What followed was a bloody battle for
Tskhinvali between Georgian militia troops and Ossetian self-defense groups that was
followed by a renewed blockade of South Ossetia that deprived the region of water and
electricity and halted industrial production for months on end.168 Within two months, 53
Ossetians had died and over 230 were injured and 20,000 more displaced to Georgia and
North Ossetia.
Given the already deeply disruptive effect of Gamsakhurdia’s nationalizing policies
and his increasingly aggressive stance against regional successionism, the leaders of both
South Ossetia and Abkhazia persisted in their appeals to the Soviet center to avoid further
Georgianization. Thus, when the USSR held a Union-wide referendum on the preservation of
the Union on 17 March 1991 and the Georgian parliament prohibited its citizens from
participating, the authorities in Tskhinvali carried on with the decision to hold the
referendum. As could have been predicted, the results bore overwhelmingly in favor of the
decision to preserve the Union and remain within the USSR.169
As then-chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Yeltsin saw South Ossetia’s
pro-Union stance as signalling its potentially treacherous pro-communist position, leading
him to initially support Gamsakhurdia as a potential ally against Gorbachev.170 The result of
talks on 24 March 1991 between Yeltsin and Gamsakhurdia was a resolution wherein the
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RSFSR recognized the abolition of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, thus tacitly
granting Gamsakhurdia Russian approval in moving forward with his advance on Tskhinvali.
Within less than a week of Gamsakhurdia ordering reinforcements to the South Ossetian
capital, Georgian parliament passed a law abolishing the Tskhinvali and Znaur districts of
South Ossetia in order to further undermine South Ossetia’s territoriality and restore Georgia
as “a unitary state with no internal boundaries.”171
The response in South Ossetia was calamitous. Border clashes grew into full scale
military operations featuring the use of automatic weapons and heavy artillery and Tskhinvali
was quickly surrounded by Georgian paramilitary forces nearing 12,000 in number.172 The
only factor preventing a full scale Georgian invasion of the city was the presence of a small
dispatch of Soviet Interior Ministry troops stationed in the city to maintain order.173 At this
point, the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies (the precursor to the Supreme Soviet of the
Russian Federation) chose to act against Yeltsin's move by passing a resolution which called
for Georgia to restore South Ossetia to the status of an autonomous republic, lift the
blockade, and resettle displaced refugees to their homes, threatening potential Soviet
intervention if terms were rejected.174
Though this resolution served to temporarily limit bloodshed throughout the majority
of the summer, the course of events was wildly altered by the events following the failed
August 1991 coup in Moscow. In the immediate aftermath of the putsch, the Georgian
Prosecutor General issued a warrant for the arrest of several leading members of the South
Ossetian government accused of “stirring up conflict between the Georgian and Ossetian
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peoples,” as well as providing aid to the coup plotters.175 While these claims remained largely
unsubstantiated, they ultimately did not result in the extradition of the accused from
Tskhinvali, a fact at least partially explained by Gamsakhurdia’s increasingly tenuous grip on
political control.
The Georgian Civil War and the Fall of the Soviet Union
Particularly following the May 1991 presidential elections, Gamsakhurdia’s
hyper-nationalistic brand of authoritarianism grew to be increasingly conspicuous. His
intolerance of political opposition, alongside allegations of treachery and deception in the
days surrounding the failed August putsch in Moscow, fueled widespread opposition against
Gamsakhurdia both domestically and internationally.176 By mid-September, irregular militia
forces, including a large portion of the Georgian National Guard in tandem with the
notoriously brutal paramilitary force known as the Mkhedrioni, began to rally behind Prime
Minister Tengiz Sigua and by late December, began active and armed opposition to
Gamsakhurdia’s regime.177 The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union on 21 December 1991,
thus effectively fell on deaf ears in Georgia as representatives from the remaining fourteen of
the fifteen Soviet Republics met in Almaty, Kazakhstan to officiate the terms of the
post-Union order. Georgia, per Gamsakhurdia’s command, was the only Republic not party
to this meeting.
This refusal to attend alongside Gamsakhurdia’s general uncooperativeness posed a
perceivable threat to Yeltsin’s greater vision of a post-Union order which he hoped the
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proposed CIS might establish.178 Gamsakhurdia had also garnered a reputation as a
Russophobe and frequently entertained the idea of constructing a “Common Caucasian
Home,” signalling a desire to create a unified regional alliance that might compromise
Russia’s 
de factoinfluence in the region.179 Nevertheless, from a surface level account,
Gamsakhurdia’s eventual removal from office was through domestic political means. On 21
December the day after the Almaty summit, the National Guard and Mkhedrionidemanded
Gamsakhurdia’s unconditional resignation. His refusal prompted the oppositionary forces to
begin firing on Parliament and the presidential apparatus building until Gamsakhurdia’s
eventual departure from Georgia on 6 January 1992, beginning his years in exile, first in
Azerbaijan, then Armenia, and ultimately Chechnya as a guest of General Djohar Dudayev.180
According to sources within Mkhedrioni, however, Russia’s role in financing and
supporting the anti-Gamsakhurdia coalition was considerable. The coalition between
segments of the National Guard and the outlawed Mkhedrioni militia had in fact been
brokered by former leaders from Georgia’s exiled communist establishment with
communication and patronage chains to the Kremlin.181 Through these networks, Moscow
actively supported the oppositionary coalition with financial support and technical assistance
in the form of military equipment and logistics training. Former chief of Mkhedrioni,Jaba
Ioseliani, personally recounts the close relations between National Guard leader Tengiz
Kitovani and Russian generals in Georgia at the time.182
Complicating the situation was the South Ossetian leadership’s decision to continue
its campaign to win the support of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian
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Federation. On 19 January 1992, the South Ossetians held a referendum on public support for
both independence and whether or not to reunite with the Russia, the latter of which elicited a
positive response from a resounding 98.2 percent of respondents.183 Yeltsin remained initially
silent on the matter, as South Ossetia’s demonstration of allegiance to Russia called into
question his prior belief in their potential treachery. The Russian parliament, however,
headed by nationalist Ruslan Khasbulatov, demonstrated strong support for the South
Ossetian cause, at least partially as a tactic to undermine the authority of the president.184
Eduard Shevardnadze and the South Ossetian Litmus Test for Russian “Peacekeeping”
Having successfully ousted Gamsakhurdia and established the provisional Military
Council, its leaders Sigua, Kitovani, and Ioseliani faced the pressure of confirming the
legitimacy of their putschist regime. Though the international community had already
recognized Georgia’s independence, the Russian military continued to assume the role of
guarantor of continued peace and stability, particularly given the Military Council’s extreme
repression of the Zviadist militants concentrated in Gamsakhurdia’s former homeland of
Mingrelia.185 The coalition thus sought a charismatic and legitimate figure to lead newly
independent Georgia. They settled on former Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and
Recently dismissed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze.
Despite his impressive credentials and considerable ruling experience, Shevardnadze
enjoyed limited support from the Georgian populace, many of whom remained dubious of his
conspicuous ties to the Kremlin.186 Nonetheless, upon his return to Georgia in March 1992,
Shevardnadze acceded to the presidency of the so-called State Council, the hastily
constructed heir to the disbanded Military Council, and entered office with the stated goal of
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“national reconciliation.”187 Although made in obvious reference to the continued action of
Zviadist conspirators throughout the country, this announcement also tacitly insinuated the
reincorporation of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia proper. For no matter the
degree of Russian support and direction he received, Shevardnadze remained committed to
preserving Georgian territorial integrity.
This proved a difficult task for a number of reasons, most of which stemmed from his
limited domestic support, rivalries within the State Council, and the worsening situation in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.188 More crippling, however, was the deep hatred for
Shevardnadze held by many within the Russian Military and in parliament, many of whom
credited Shevardnadze, former Soviet Foreign Minister under Gorbachev and a strong
proponent of “new thinking,” as having been as chief among the actors that helped
orchestrate the fall of the Soviet Union.189 This contributed to the strained relationship that
would soon come to marr bilateral relations between the Georgian and Russian leadership.
The first major test for this relationship would arise from residual tensions that
remained between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi since the partial settlement of May 1991. Although
delegations from South Ossetia, Georgia and the North Ossetian SSR had met on 13 May
1992 to discuss a permanent settlement, large scale hostilities broke out again outside of the
South Ossetian capital on 8 June between detachments of the Ossetian Guards and Georgian
paramilitary units.190 It was not until 20 June 1992, however, less than a day after the
Moldovan assault on Bendery, that the Shevardnadze regime initiated its full scale assault on
Tskhinvali which effectively succeeded in destroying the city. While they were unable to
seize the city, Georgian forces shelled and mortared the city throughout the assault, burning
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down or destroying nearly 80 percent of the dwellings and administrative buildings in the
city.191 Furthermore, the flow of refugees from South Ossetia also exacerbated the situation in
North Ossetia, where tensions between Ingush and Ossetians had been mounting and
threatened to further destabilize the already deeply fractured north Caucausus.192
Though Shevardnadze initially denying official Georgian involvement in the siege of
the city, citing the uncontrollable actions of “detachments out of the control of the Georgian
government, the Russian Government later that day issued a statement accusing Georgia of
staging a “military action designed to drive the non-Georgian population out of South
Ossetia.”193 This Russian response, though driven primarily by fears for the potentially
disastrous effect of further refugee flows on the stability of the region (particularly given the
worsening situation in Chechnya), was also underscored by intense sympathies for the South
Ossetians by nationalists in Moscow. Rutskoi labeled the Georgian invasion a genocide
against the Ossetian people “conducted not by groups out of the control of the Georgian State
Council, but by detachments of the national guard.”194
Shevardnadze’s recalcitrance was short lived however, likely tempered by the
unexpectedly swift and aggressive Russian actions in Moldova over the course of 19-22 June,
and he was quickly forced to admit that the Georgian National Guard had indeed led the
charge. He also agreed on 24 June 1992 to meet with Yeltsin and representatives of North
and South Ossetia in Sochi to sign a cease-fire and discuss a settlement to the conflict,
leading to the ratification on the issuance of peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia on 3 July.
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the deployment of a joint Russian, North Ossetian, South Ossetian, and Georgian armed force
totalling at roughing 2,000 troops.196 The participation of North Ossetians also allowed for an
effectively Moscow dominated force that has since been able to enforce South Ossetia’s de
factoindependence. Russia’s commitment to this end has persisted, most notably following
the events of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, wherein Russia intervened to protect Tskhinvali
from a Georgian attempt to reintegrate the region by military force.
Particularly given that it was in no way coordinated within the CIS, this peacekeeping
mission was the first of its kind and served as a template for future Russian-led missions in
Moldova, Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan (though Baku’s veto would ultimately prevent
the deployment of peacekeepers). Its relative success has also reasonably justified continued
Russian troop presence on Georgian soil, and reaffirmed, particularly in the eyes of the
Russian military leadership, the indispensability of Russia as a mediating force in the FSU. In
the words of Deputy Defence Minister, Colonel General Georgi Kondratev, the primary
military authority over Russian peacekeeping forces, the success of the Sochi agreement has
demonstrated that Russia alone possesses the capability and will to separate warring factions
and induce a negotiated settlement.197 As he claims, “peacekeeping in Russia has become an
issue of government policy, and peacekeeping issues are now part of our national military
doctrine,” a position that would increasingly grow to define Russia’s policy in the near
abroad, particularly as hostilities in Abkhazia began to intensify.198
The War in Abkhazia
Whereas the conflict in South Ossetia was waged and resolved swiftly and relatively
bloodlessly, the war in Abkhazia was far more complex and gruesome, involving a much
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larger scope of violence and drawing in a motley assortment of combatants from around the
region. The conflict spiral began amidst the chaos of early 1992, when the Abkhazian
Supreme Soviet seized upon the apparent weakness in Tbilisi (and strength in Moscow) by
voting on July 23 to restore the Abkhaz Constitution of 1925 under which Abkhazia retained
its Union republic status and was not under Georgian administrative control.199 This decision
was made in partial response to the State Council’s decision to reinstate Georiga’s pre-Soviet
constitution of 1921, which did not stipulate the status of Abkhazia’s independence, therefore
provided no pretext for Abkhazian autonomy.200 The Georgian response, of course, was to
annul the decision, though Shevardnadze was hesitant to act upon the more sanguine
demands from the more conservative and pro-nationalist factions of Georgian civil society.
Domestic pressure from pro-nationalist factions continued to mount, however, particularly in
opposition to Shevardnadze’s decision to allow Russian peacekeepers into South Ossetia.
Meanwhile, Zviadist militant groups dispersed throughout and around
Gamsakhurdia’s home region of Mingrelia continued to engage Georgian National Guard
forces. Georgian forces had quickly suppressed the attempted Zviadist uprising in March
1992 but this merely spawned a series of guerrilla actions and kidnappings throughout the
summer of 1992.201 On 11 August, after a declaration of amnesty for former Gamsakhurdia
supporters by Shevardnadze, Zviadist groups responded promptly with a second round of
hostage-taking, among whom included Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr
Kavsadze. In response, on 14 August, Shevardnadze dispatched Defense Minister Tengiz
Kitovani into the Mingrelian-inhabited region of eastern Abkhazia with a contingent of
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Georgian National Guard troops to find the kidnappers and retrieve Kavsadze.202 By as soon
as 18 August, Georgian troops had invaded Sukhumi and sacked the Abkhazian parliament
building, sending Abkhazian members fleeing to Gudauta providing Kitovani with the
resources necessary to establish a pro-Georgian council in the Abkhazian capital203.
The events that followed and the official Georgian account of its actions in Abkhazia
have since been held up to considerable scrutiny. The first issue concerns Georgian
justifications for intervention and assault on Sukhumi. The primary impetus for intervention
concerned the kidnapping of Kavsadze, whom Shevardnadze and Kitovani hoped to repatriate
to Georgia, by force if necessary. A secondary dilemma was compounded by the issue of the
recently downed Inguri river railroad bridge, the only operational rail line connecting Georgia
and Russia, the destruction of which was linked to Zviadist forces operating in Abkhazia.204
Though the Georgian military underlined the strategic need to defend and monitor the rail
station alongside the retrieval of Kavsadze and other hostages as primary justifications for
their intervention, circumstantial evidence reveals both to be dubious claims.
Upon their entrance into Abkhazia, the bulk of Georgian troops spent little time
searching for hostages and instead continued further West, arresting the mayor of
Ochamchira and skirmishing with Abkhazian troops as they marched towards Sukhumi.205
Furthermore, given the scale of armaments donned by the Georgian military and their limited
cooperation and open conflagrations with Abkhaz troops, atop the fact that no evidence
pointed to the presence of hostages west of Sukhumi, Kitovani’s assault more closely
resembles a concerted Georgian effort to quickly and decisively assert military control over
the breakaway region.
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Shevardnadze, likely recognizing the volatility of the situation, made rapid efforts to
avoid blame for the ultimately failed invasion, claiming that Kitovani had acted
autonomously and against orders by attacking Sukhumi.206 The extent to which the Georgian
government supported Kitovani, however, is also contentious, particularly given demands by
Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops upon
learning of Kitovani’s attack on Sukhumi.207 Regardless of Tblisi’s complicity in the decision
to divert attention to the siege on Sukhumi, Shevardnadze nonetheless supported the outcome
of the invasion, saying “we have done the right thing,” and framing the immediate declaration
of war by the Abkhaz as a provocation over which he could justify a war of “national
defence.”208 The war that followed would bear serious consequences for the future stability
of Georgia for years to come.
Early Sources of Russian Intervention
The war’s outbreak would also offer revanchists in Russia a key window of
opportunity to test the limits of the liberal internationalist resolve in Moscow. As mentioned
prior, Russia's early foreign policy making apparatus had undergone rapid institutional
decentralization, breeding a great deal of confusion, contradiction, and competition where the
actual implementation of policy was concerned. Thus, the official Russian position towards
the Abkhaz conflict and the Transcaucasus region in general during much of 1992 was
similarly disorganized and contradictory. Again, much of this stems from the fact that early
1992 represented the height of power for the liberal internationalist factions in parliament,
with whom Yeltsin himself was initially aligned.209
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As such, Yeltsin initially strove to set a cautionary and neutral tone from the early
days of the conflict, warning the peoples of the North Caucasus against seeking to destabilize
the situation while also personally pledging to take diplomatic steps to resolve the conflict.210
He also issued troops to secure the border with Russia and was successful initially in
brokering a nominal ceasefire at a joint Georgian-Abkhaz conference in Moscow in early
September 1992 aimed at the “restoration of security in the region.”211 Perhaps most
crucially, he strongly emphasized the need to preserve the inviolability of post-Soviet
borders, standing in stark contrast to his communist and nationalist opponents in parliament
who cited Abkhazia’s strong pro-Russian orientation as cause for incorporating the territory
into the Russian Federation.212
Though this was never a reasonably viable strategy, such sentiments were shared by
many of these nationalists who occupied key leadership positions in the Supreme Soviet and
offered active and vocal support for the Abkhazian separatist movement, which they saw as
an exploitable lever that Russia might use to pressure Georgia into accepting CIS
membership and accept Russia’s permanent military presence in Georgia.213 The Civic Union,
a leading and ostensibly moderate coalition of deputies in parliament, levied criticisms at the
president for his “unjustified passivity” and refusal to defend the minority rights of the
Abkhaz.214 Sergei Baburin, leader of the conservative Russian All-Peoples-Union, went even
further stating that upon visiting the conflict zone he was unsure that Abkhazia was even part
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of Georgia.215 Though their efforts initially conflicted with those pursued by Yeltsin and the
Foreign Ministry, these nationalists helped stir interventionist momentum that would
indirectly affect events on the ground in Abkhazia and, particularly given support from
elements of the Russian military, proved successful in both deligitmating the liberal pacifist
strategy and shaping Russia’s approach to the conflict.
The first major move undertaken by the Supreme Soviet was their adoption of a series
of resolutions on 25 September 1992 condemning Georgian actions in Abkhazia and
demanding for the full withdrawal of Georgian troops and the subsequent deployment of a
Russian peace-keeping force.216 The resolutions also called for Yeltsin to broker a new set of
negotiations, thus tacitly rejecting the 3 September tripartite agreement. Roughly a week
later, on 2 October 1992, Abkhaz forces supported by volunteers from the Confederation of
Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus217 staged an attack on the Georgian held Abkhaz town of
Gagri. This elicited a calamitous response from Tbilisi as Shevardnadze cast the events in
Gagri as “the result of a vast plot against Georgia,” portraying the Supreme Soviet’s
resolution as having empowered and encouraged the Abkhaz assault on Georgian troops.218
Instances such as this would come to define the course of the conflict, particularly as Russian
support for Abkhazia grew more pronounced in 1993, when remarkable Abkhaz victories
grew to closely follow demonstrations of tacit support from conservatives in Moscow.
The Bureaucratic Struggle for Power
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Though the September ceasefire demonstrated a seemingly sincere effort on Yeltsin’s
part towards localizing the conflict, its apparent inability to influence the events unfolding in
Abkhazia fueled Yeltsin’s retreat from the issue, symbolizing his fading commitment to the
prescriptions of liberal internationalism. In his absence, deliberation over Russian policy in
Abkhazia at the executive level grew into a power struggle between The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Though both ministries possessed deeply
differing positions on the current administration in Georgia and the method of securing
Russian interests in the region, they agreed on a handful of “first principles” regarding
Russia’s diplomatic approach. These included the refusal to restore bilateral relations with
Georgia until the resolution of the Abkhazia war as well as a commitment to a Russia
dominated conflict resolution process free from external manipulation by international
organizations.219 Both also agreed on the need to maintain Georgian territorial integrity to
prevent a wave of secessionist movements across the already unstable North Caucasus.220
The ministries differed, however, in their opinions on how best to apply these
principles to the broader pursuit of a lasting settlement. To begin with, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was staffed by a handful of bureaucrats whom Shevardnadze had himself
promoted when he served as minister, chief of which included Kozyrev himself.221 Owing to
this as well as other more pragmatic factors, the MFA took a more conciliatory approach
concerning relations with Shevardnadze, whom they saw as crucial for the perpetuation of a
stable and friendly Georgia.222 Therefore, the MFA had initially sought to normalize relations
between Russia and Georgia and coordinated with the MoD in the early months of 1992 to
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officiate transferalls of military equipment from Russian to Georgian troops that began in
June and continued into August. 223
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Kozyrev strove, as he had in Moldova, to pursue a
peaceful resolution to the conflict. In August 1992 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a
report on the near abroad which, though it advocated for a leading Russian role in the region,
still rejected the use of force as a tool of policy. 224The effects of the MFA failure in
managing Russian interests in Transnistria, however, grew increasingly evident through
Kozyrev’s general absence from the key decision making process in Abkhazia until roughly
spring of 1993. By that time, Kozyrev’s perspectives on multilateralism had already
undergone a sea change. Although the MFA did express interest in cooperating with the UN,
likely to secure financial support for the costly task of peacekeeping, Kozyrev also reportedly
told the Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, that the Russian
government had considerable reservations regarding a UN peace conference and that it would
ideally seek a regional peacekeeping effort in line with the September 1992 Moscow
agreement.225
The waning influence of the MFA allowed the military to assume a more prominent
role in determining the thrust of Russian policy in the region. As the war’s events will attest,
Yeltsin granted the military an increasingly significant degree of latitude in shaping security
policy, particularly towards the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 as Yeltsin’s liberal
technocrat allies drew criticism for their failing policies agendas. Issues surrounding the illicit
nationalisation of Soviet military equipment had been a long standing point of contention
between Russia and Georgia, as it had been throughout the conflict ridden Caucasus.
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Although Defence Minister Pavel Grachev had initially agreed to the peaceful transferal of
military equipment from Georgia beginning in May 1992 and had linked this issue with
Georgia's entrance into the CIS, the outbreak of fighting following the invasion of Abkhazia
was followed by a wholesale halt in military transfers that continued until late 1993.226
The ideational elements of the MoD’s approach revolved around the desire to
maintain a strategic Russian troop presence in Georgia. At the time of the war’s outbreak,
Russia had five active Russian military bases in Georgia at the time. The largest of these was
located in in the coastal Abkhaz city of Gudauta, where the Abkhazian government-in-exile,
led by former Communist boss Vladislav Ardzinba, had fled following the fall of Sukhumi.227
Stressing the strategic value of these military positions, Grachev in a 23 February visit to
Gudauta openly stated the Russian military’s strategic intention to remain in Abkhazia so as
not to “lose the exit to the Black Sea.”228 This demonstration of naked ambition was received
warmly by nationalists and key figures within the Russian military establishment, many of
whom were deeply opposed to Yeltsin’s approach, arguing that the Russian military had the
will and means to defend Abkhazia if granted the right to do so.229
Covert Intervention Strategies
Interventionist arguments were strengthened through 1992 and early 1993 as bilateral
relations between Georgia and Russia steadily deteriorated. Threats to Russian military
deployments began to emerge as early as 16 August when a Russian airborne division was
issued to the base at Gudauta for assistance in evacuating stranded Russian vacationers from
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the conflict zone and drew fire from Georgian military formations.230 The series of more
direct attacks on Russian troops that followed soon after, however, proved instrumental
towards mobilizing Russian military and government officials to demand a more assertive
stance from Moscow on the conflict. On 14 December 1992, a surface-to-air missile fired
from Georgian occupied territory shot down a Russian military helicopter airlifting refugees
from the conflict zone, killing all aboard - mostly women and children.231 This was followed
soon after by the 18 January downing of a Russian Mi-8 helicopter and a subsequent raid by
Georgian irregular units on the Russian Fourth Supply Base in Tbilisi.232
These factors, alongside encouragement from the Supreme Soviet and the Defence
Ministry hierarchy, allowed the Russian military and its supporters in Moscow to further
justify a position of increasingly direct support for Abkhazian forces. In spite of Yeltsin’s
liberal platitudes emphasizing Russia’s regard for Georgian territorial integrity, a closer
examination of the events on the ground in Abkhazia crucially supports the notion that, even
before these events, agents within the Russian ground forces and military lobbies were
already engaged in both moral and material support of Abkhazian forces throughout the
course of their engagements with the Georgian military.
Although evidence for direct military support was not immediately forthcoming, the
series of impressive Abkhazian military victories against the purportedly better equipped
Georgian forces that occurred throughout late 1992 and into 1993 heightened speculation
regarding the possibility of covert Russian support. Various eyewitness accounts report the
presence of Russian military equipment and active dutymen fighting amongst the ranks of
Abkhazian forces. While evidence is limited in large part to personal testimonies, a handful
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of cases point almost undeniably to Russia’s decidedly impartial role. Even Kozyrev himself
admitted in November 1993 that “the Abkhaz demanded military aid,” though he refused to
comment on whether or not the Russian military ever rendered such aid.233
Georgian accounts of Russian air support for Abkhazian troops against Georgian
positions were ultimately corroborated after the downing of a Russian SU-27 on 19 March
1993 over Sukhumi.234 The Russian newspaper Izvestia reports that its pilot was Russian
Major Vatslav Shipko and lists it as one among a number of Russian aircraft shot down in
Georgia, flying in the face of claims by Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev that such
planes were piloted by Georgians bombing their own troops to ferment an anti-Russian
disinformation campaign.235 Other personal testimonies support these claims, such as those
from Mikhail Demianov, a businessman from St. Petersburg taken prisoner by the Georgians
who detailed his involvement in selling arms to the Abkhaz through illicit channels and
confirmed the presence of active Russian armed support of Abkhazian units.236 Reports of
support for Abkhazian separatists also coincided with a sudden halt of military transfers from
Russia to Georgia officiated by the Russian Ministry of Defence beginning in August 1992,
following the outbreak of violence in the region.237
While sources detailing the active participation of conscripted Russian soldiers remain
subject to scrutiny, irrefutable evidence stands linking the participation of potential Russian
proxies the conflict zone. From the early days of the conflict the Abkhaz received support
from a variety of sources, including fighters from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples,
Chechen militants, as well as members of the Grand United Circle of Cossacks, many of
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whom were themselves Russian citizens, although likely operating without direct orders from
Moscow.238 Although Yeltsin had personally warned freelance fighters and rogue troops in
the region from participating in the conflict, Russia made no significant steps to quell the
flow of fighters from Russian territory into Abkhazia.239
This directly contradicts Yeltsin’s stated commitment to preserving Georgian
territorial integrity in his “Appeal From the President to the Leadership of Georgia and
Abkhazia,” wherein he promised that Russia would do all within its power to prevent the
spread of arms and fighters from Russia into Abkhazia.240 It should be noted, however, that
the dissonance between Yeltsin’s rhetoric regarding Russia’s role and the events on the
ground speaks less to Yeltsin’s hidden or deceptive motives than it does to his tenuous
control over Russian ground troops and the increasingly independent will of the Russian
military.
Spring 1993 and the Formulation of a Foreign Policy Consensus
Regardless of the degree of initial coordination, by early 1993, the Russian
government appeared to have developed a workable modus operandifor Abkhazia and for its
broader approach to managing conflicts in the near abroad. Yeltsin’s infamous 28 February
1993 speech to the Civic Union calling for UN recognition of Russia’s indispensable position
as guarantor of peace and stability in the FSU represents the first of many statements made by
the president that reveal his developing centrist nationalist views on foreign policy. This shift
also reflects Yeltsin’s increasingly open willingness to allow the military establishment a
freer hand in directing Russia’s foreign policy in the near abroad, noticeable particularly in
light of Grachev’s comments earlier that week declaring Abkhazia “a strategically important
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area for the Russian Army,” before an unsanctioned trip to Gudauta on 30 February to, as
ITAR-TASS reported, “support the troops.”241
Although bombings in Sukhumi intensified considerably shortly after his arrival,
Grachev continued to deny circumstantial evidence of direct Russian aid to Abkhazia. He
even went so far as to suggest that bombing raids supposedly carried out by recognizably
Russian aircraft were in fact executed by Georgian planes with Russian flags painted on
ostensibly because “a real war is being waged in Georgia by the government against its own
people.”242 Even after evidence of Russian interference was made public following the
downing of Major Shipko’s aircraft the next day, Grachev did not adjust his assessment or
face reprisal from Moscow for his now blatant deception. Rather, Grachev was appointed by
Yeltsin to head the ceasefire negotiations the following July.243 This all suggests what many
within Russia already presumed, that Yeltsin had effectively relinquished control over
military policy in Abkhazia to the Ministry of Defence. Statements from the Russian press at
the time confirm this, with Nezavisimaya Gazeta reporting on 20 March of growing
“bewilderment” in Tbilisi regarding “Yeltsin’s silence with regards to the Abkhaz conflict”
leaving both Georigans and the Russian people wondering whether he intends to “leave
Shevardnadze one on one with the Russian military” or “chose to interfere in the events.”244
Much of this indecision can be explained by Yeltsin’s increasingly tenuous grip on
political power at the beginning of 1993. Yeltsin had already begun to bend to parliamentary
pressure for his weak support for the rights of Russians and other minorities in the near
abroad, as he began to levy similar criticism against the Foreign Ministry in October 1992.245
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By January 1993, significant changes had occured within Yeltsin’s government, particularly
the replacement of former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, the face of Russia’s ambitious and
controversial “shock therapy” program, with the ex-director of Gazprom, Viktor
Chernomyrdin, signalling a shift away from the liberal economic policy heralded by the
Westernizers in Moscow. Furthermore, by late 1992, it had become clear that previously
entertained proposals for Western financial aid packages were unlikely to gain the necessary
parliamentary and administrative support in Washington and Brussels, thereby wholly
discounting the liberal argument that Russia should contain its military actions in the near
abroad in order to protect hopes of Western aid.246 Donaldson and Nogee report this gradual
realization as having been crucial towards ending the “Romantic” period of Russian foreign
policy and signalling a shift by the liberals towards more “pragmatic nationalist” views.247
By this point, the Foreign Ministry began to adapt to these major domestic and
structural shifts and thus grew to develop a harder position on the Abkhaz issue and on
Russia’s foreign policy options in general. Beginning in late 1992, the MFA grew harshly
critical of the Georgian military’s actions in Abkhazia, labelling the 14 December downing of
a Russian refugee helicopter a“gross provocation.” 248 Deputy Foreign Minister Boris
Pastukhov joined in roughly a week later, calling Georgia’s attack an intentional act of
barbarism before later adding, rather ominously, that “We [Russia] will not let you win this
war.”249 As mentioned before, spring and summer of 1993 saw Kozyrev himself begin to
reorient the Foreign Ministry towards support for Russian unilateralism in the conflict
resolution process. He also began to endorse more “traditional” conceptions of Russia’s
foreign policy goals in the region, stressing in July 1993 “the strategic and economic
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importance Russia attaches to the Northern Caucasus and to its southern areas as a whole,” as
well as Russia’s need for a stable and friendly Georgia.250 This shift began to signal a new era
in Russian Foreign policy making that was decidedly centrist nationalist in character.
Foreign Policy Consensus in Action: Peacekeeping as a Tool of Coercion
This coalescence of foreign policy consensus in Moscow gave life to an ostensible
strategy for Russia’s ongoing manipulation of the Abkhaz crisis. Beginning in mid-1993,
Russian policy in Georgia aimed to secure Georgia’s position in CIS, establish a legal
framework for a continued and indefinite Russian military presence in Georgia, and achieve
an international mandate for the deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops in the near
abroad. As these goals became achievable in the fall of 1993 following a series of key events
in Abkhazia over the summer, the Russian position grew increasingly more forceful and
coherent.
Against seemingly insurmountable odds, the so-called “Abkhaz separatists” had by
July 1993 succeeded in securing a series of key victories against Georgian forces. Owing
largely to Abkhazian advances, as well as increasing pressure from Grachev and newly
appointed special envoy to Abkhazia, Boris Pastukhov, Shevardnadze was induced to sign a
ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia in Sochi on 27 July 1993 wherein Georgia agreed to
substantial concessions, including the restoration of the Abkhazian government and the
withdrawal of both Abkhazian and Georgian troops from the conflict zone.251 Though the
treaty succeeded in restoring Russian-Georgian bilateral relations, definitive negotiations
were stalled in part due to Georgia’s refusal to accept Russian basing rights in Georgia or
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endorse a Russian peacekeeping mission, even going so far as to request a UN sponsored
mission in its place.252
Mere weeks later, on 15 September, Abkhazian forces broke the ceasefire agreement
and launched a massive and well-organized offensive to retake Sukhumi. The Russian
response was seemingly mixed as officials in Moscow imposed limited economic sanctions
against Abkhazia and condemned their unsanctioned use of force. Closer inspection reveals a
number of inconsistencies with the Russian position. First of all, Shevardnadze’s request for
Russian troops to enforce the separation of warring forces was initially rejected based on the
thinly veiled excuse that “riots” in Sukhumi prevented the safe deployment of Russian forces
in the conflict zone.253 Serious questions also arose regarding the Abkhazian forces’
possession of heavy artillery and rocket launchers at the time of the attacks, the breechblocks
for which the Russian military was supposed to have confiscated according to the Sochi
agreement.254 This evidence, alongside the surprisingly impressive combat performance of the
Abkhazian forces against the only partially withdrawn Georgian forces, strongly suggests
Russia’s benign underestimation of, if not direct coordination with, the Abkhaz separatists.
Shortly before and after the assault, Grachev had also pressed Georgian Defense
Ministry officials to accept a treaty confirming the legal status of Russian troops on Georgian
soil, repeatedly linking the issue to the signing of a treaty of friendship and treaty as well as
to “the restoration of lasting peace in Abkhazia.”255 Similar, if not more forceful, demands
were presented by Russian Vice Premier Alexander Shokhin in the days following
Abkhazia’s attack, wherein he reinforced the fact that under current circumstances, Moscow
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would not interfere to enforce the ceasefire or prevent Georgia’s defeat in Abkhazia.256
Accordingly, Russian aid was unforthcoming and the Abkhazians were able to retake
Sukhumi and secure the border with Georgia within a matter of weeks.
The abject failure of Georgian forces to repel the Abkhaz offensive signalled the
unceremonious return of Gamsakhurdia, whose “Zviadist” forces quickly occupied the
majority of western Georgia, cutting off major supply lines to the capital and pushing the
government in Tbilisi nearly to the point of collapse. Still unable to secure outside aid and
facing imminent and forceful removal from power, Shevardnadze travelled to Moscow on 8
October 1993 to reach a compromise agreement with Russia. In a series of talks that would
continue into the following year, Shevardnadze, in exchange for Russia’s aid in repelling
Gamsakhurdia’s forces and preventing the “full dismemberment” of the Georgian state,
agreed to accept CIS membership on Georgia’s behalf, lease the Black Sea port of Poti to
Russia, and allow Russian troops to remain in Georgia indefinitely.257 In exchange, Russian
troops were deployed to Georgia to stabilize the situation and, though dispatched with the
declared intention securing key rail and telecommunications networks, helped crucially aid
Georgian forces in the forcible expulsion of Zviadist forces from the country.258 Russia also
engaged in a series of talks with Tbilisi beginning in November 1993 and culminating in the
1994 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which, alongside finalizing Russia’s basing rights
in Georgia also formalized a UN sponsored return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia.259
Particularly as events in Chechnya worsened, Russia also proceeded to crack down on
Abkhazia, condemning harshly its brutal treatment of Georgians denying it any prospects of
achieving independence from Georgia.
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The results of these talks as a whole, however, in light of Yeltsin’s victory against his
chief nationalist opponents in the Supreme Soviet, demonstrate the degree to which Yeltsin’s
influence as president and views on intervention had evolved in the roughly two years since
he took office. This was also crucially shaped by the Western response (or rather lack
thereof) to Russia’s actions in Abkhazia. Given the relative absence of international observers
and the fact that much of Russia’s purported interference remains either unconfirmed or
subject to scrutiny, the international community was largely silent on the course of events in
Abkhazia, a circumstance amplified by the worsening crisis in Yugoslavia to which Western
governments were much more inclined to direct their attention.
Nonetheless, Shevardnadze hoped that Georgia might be able to secure a multilateral
peacekeeping mission that might limit Russia’s ability to unilaterally dictate the terms of
settlement. In spite of his popularity in the West, Shevardnadze watched in disappointment as
Britain, France, and the United States all expressed deep hesitation towards participating in a
United Nations peacekeeping operation, ultimately forcing the Georgian prime minister little
choice but to request Russian aid for the enforcement of a permanent peace settlement.260
Though the eventual Russian mission lacked a UN mandate, it received support from then
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who in May 1994 recommended that the UN
endorse a Russia-led peacekeeping force, given the fact that the conditions for a UN
operation remained unfulfilled at the time.261
Bill Clinton even expressed his own somewhat confused endorsement of Russian
actions in the near abroad, noting in a 14 January 1994 speech to a Russian TV audience that
Russia’s forays into its “near abroad” are not unlike the United States interventions in
Grenada and Panama, themselves having been subject to intense scrutiny from the UN

260
261

Kozhokin, US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force, 81..
Lynch, 
Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, 140.

Vidal 82

Security Council, and shakily compared Russia’s actions in the region to those the US has
traditionally pursued under its Monroe Doctrine.262 With the apparent, albeit weak and at
times begrudging acquiescence of the West, Russia was more or less granted a free hand to
secure its strategic victories in the region. Thus on 10 May 1994, Shevardnadze agreed to the
deployment of a Russia-sponsored CIS peacekeeping force of 3,000 troops to be deployed
along both sides of the Inguri river, the natural land divide between Abkhazia and Georgia.263
Ultimately, the results of the Abkhaz war and the conflict in South Ossetia were
formative to the degree that they further crystalized a consensus amongst Russian foreign
policy elites on the efficacy and necessity of unilateral intervention and peacekeeping
missions. Resolve amongst the various centers of gravity within Moscow on how best to
achieve these goals was, much like in Moldova, at first varied and reflected the mutually
conflictual ideational interests of the actors and administrative departments involved. While
conflict resolution initially served as a means for localizing both regional wars to prevent
conflict spillover and the creation of a power vacuum that might invite the interference of
other regional powers, the increasing influence of the military, intervention and peacekeeping
were ultimately adopted as a means of ensuring Georgian membership in the CIS and
constructing a legal framework to justify continued Russian troop presence. Yeltsin’s
growing domestic unpopularity and weak responses from the West allowed for this gradual
maturation of a more assertive and coercive Russian policy in Georgia. As a result of these
changing circumstances, response efforts gradually shifted from confused and slow moving
attempts at peaceful reconciliation into a suasive strategy designed to coerce Tbilisi into
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accepting Moscow’s designs for institutionalized and internationally recognized regional
hegemony in the Caucasus.

Conclusions
Russia is a country very often regarded as a baseline test case for realist theory. As a
traditionally centralized state, Russia is often typecast as an insecure aggressor, equally prone
to uncooperativeness on the world stage as it is to expansionism on its fringes. While the
tendency to assume that such characteristics are predetermined may be tempting, Russia’s
ostensibly cooperative and accommodating political character following the collapse of the
Soviet Union complicates this seemingly straightforward assumption. Whether the
decentralization and “liberalism” of the Russian Federation in the early 1990’s represents a
historical anomaly for a typically autocratic state is the subject of a different discussion. What
matters more is how and why Russia’s liberals abandoned their more integrationist views in
favor of more “realist” national interests.
When asked the spring of 1994 to explain the noticeable shift in his views on foreign
policy, Andrey Kozyrev noted that “as a democrat he felt constrained to take into account
public opinion on foreign policy matters.”264 This comment might be more facetious than it is
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demonstrative of Kozyrev’s serious convictions on the matter, however, the thrust of his
statement speaks to a very important assumption that this project seeks to assert: national
ideas matter. Whether articulated or acted upon implicitly, national ideas form the basis of
political action and set the parameters for failure or success. They can empower domestic
political coalitions and they can topple powerful regimes.
As has been previously asserted, the Russian foreign policy establishment’s gradual
endorsement of interventionist views can be traced directly to the deligitmation of liberal
ideas promoting diplomatic approaches to conflict resolution, thus creating ideal
circumstances for hawkish policy entrepreneurs to press for a more active interventionist
policy in the near abroad. The perceivably successful model for intervention and
peacekeeping was first showcased in Moldova, as a result of which Russia was able to ensure
Moldova’s entrance in the CIS, exclude Romania from the peace process, and maintain a
strategic troop presence in Transnistria. This can be seen further through Russia’s responses
to the conflicts in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as the progression of events on the
ground which repeatedly confirmed the utility of Russian intervention and peacekeeping
efforts towards achieving Russia’s national interests in the region. The mission to South
Ossetia represents a watershed moment for the development of a template for Russian
peacekeeping, setting a standard that would help to fuel support for and legitimize later
Russian missions. These effects were most noticeable following the Russian military’s covert
intervention and eventual peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia, which yielded considerable
results, namely Georgia’s admission into the CIS, the preemption of interference from
regional rivals and international organizations, and the international community’s de facto
acceptance of Russia as a reliable peacekeeping force in the near abroad.
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This process was made possible by an array of key circumstantial factors that helped
weaken the liberal platform and empower those with more assertive and statist foreign policy
strategies. In this sense, the decentralized structure of the early Russian Federation was
instrumental in that it prevented the initially dominant liberal ideas held by the Foreign
Minister, the President, and his entourage from being sufficiently institutionalized. This in
turn had consequences at the domestic level, as Yeltsin’s enemies in parliament aggressively
exploited his leadership weakness and tenuous power base, forcing him to rely increasingly
on individuals and factions within the military for political support, thus facilitating the
greater autonomy of the armed forces to pursue and initiate intervention. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the Western response to Russia’s growing assertiveness was decidedly
weak and apprehensive, leaving Russia little to lose should it seek to further instrumentalize
“peacekeeping” as a gendarme of Russian influence in the near abroad. As a result, once
intervening events such as the successful defense of Bendery (and general absence of
international repercussions) alongside the failure to secure Western financial aid
delegitimated the key assumptions of the liberal camp, centrist and radical nationalist policy
entrepreneurs were able to exploit these open policy windows to forward their more
aggressive foreign policy ideas. The result was the gradual adoption of more pragmatic
centrist nationalist views on foreign policy by actors from across the ideational spectrum.
Although this project deals specifically with the immediate post-Soviet period, the
conclusions drawn here are nonetheless helpful towards understanding the current state of
foreign policy making in the Russian Federation. Most notably, since current President
Vladimir Putin’s rise to prominence beginning in 1999, Russia has grown increasingly
centralized both institutionally and politically. Putin has successfully co-opted or eliminated
key members of the influential industrial oligarch class, silenced the free press, and
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established effectively personalized control over the legislative branch, the judicial system,
and the armed forces. These factors have allowed the national ideas commonly forwarded by
the president to enjoy stable support within the Russian national discourse.
It is also interesting to note that many of the ideas that Putin endorses revolve around
conspicuously centrist nationalist positions, namely the restoration of Russia’s great power
status, limited yet pragmatic rapprochement with the West, and the defence of
Russian/Russophone minorities in the near abroad. The president’s articulation of these ideas
has played a major role in his justifying the implementation of interventionist efforts in recent
years, particularly in regards to the August 2008 war in South Ossetia and the March 2014
annexation of Crimea. Despite the remarkably negative and costly responses that such actions
have garnered from the international community, Russia’s commitment to an assertive
foreign policy has persisted.
This is in part due to Putin’s personalized control over policy formulation and
execution as well as his systematic exclusion of potential rivals from the political process.
These roadblocks to significant ideational change in Moscow have troubling implications as
they suggest that Russia might again seek to justify similarly interventionist efforts elsewhere
within the FSU. Should Putin perceive potential threats to Russian minorities in, for example,
the Baltic states, all of which are now members of NATO, the question of whether or not
Russia might intervene as a reactionary measure remains uncomfortably ambiguous.
Regardless, absent any major shocks to the existing international order, institutional
restructuring within Moscow, or any other independently occurring domestic political
shakeups, the devil we know may be at least somewhat preferable to the devil we don’t.
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